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08 Oct, 2013
Women’s Day 2013 Celebration
Address by Mrs Kholofelo Mokgawa, UDEMWO National Chairperson at a UDEMWO Women’s Day 2013 Celebration on 9 August 2013 at the Westlake Community Hall, Cape Town “A centenary of working together towards sustainable women empowerment and gender equality” TOPIC: Women’s Day: is there anything to celebrate? The answers are “yes” and “no”. YES, we should celebrate and salute women who sacrificed their lives and took it upon themselves to lead and march to the Union Building on 9 August 1956. YES, we should celebrate this day to remember the historic and powerful march of 20 000 women of all creed and colour, who stood firm like an iron fist, principled by togetherness, the “we-feeling” and unity. YES, we salute bomama Helen Josephs, Rahima Moosa, Sophia William, Charlotte Maxeke, Lillian Ngoyi and many others. Their march was a significant step towards gender equality in South Africa. YES, we should celebrate Women’s Day to recognise the contribution made by women in the fight against apartheid. Every year on this day as South African women we should remember the sacrifice, the commitment, the dedication and the unity of those women. Those women demonstrated that as women, we are strong, we are special, powerful and invaluable; The slogan used “wathint abafazi, wathint’ imbokodo uzokufa’ – when you strike the women you strike a rock. You will be crushed. These words should give us courage and we should be as hard as a rock. Storms of the struggle should instead harden us and make us stronger. On the other hand, Programme Director; gentle ladies and men the answer is a big NO. What is it that we should celebrate? When we are faced with challenges? Women’s Day might be a step in the right direction, but it is also a token of recognition in a country where the incidents of rape is rated number one in the whole world. Ladies and gentlemen is there anything to celebrate? There is nothing. To name a few, ladies and gentlemen; Women and children are treated as nothing e.g. incidents of brutal killings and abusing women and children especially during August every year. For example, the recent serial killer in Mamelodi and Atteridgeville and many others. What is the Government doing with this perpetrators if found? They arrest them today, two days later you see them walking in the street and even boasting – meaning that they will wrong you and be released tomorrow etc. Ladies and gentlemen, we live in fear – should we really claim to be free if we are confined behind high walls and sophisticated security only because we fear for our safety and are the prey of our own sons and men? Another point that proves that some of us are still abused, in the area where I come from, there is a culture and belief that a woman should be lashed with a sjambok. There is a case in the deep rural area where a husband had lashed his own wife with a sjambok and when realizing that his own child of about 1 ½ year was crying while the mother was beaten. The husband threw the sjambok down, took the child with his one hand and start beating the wife with that child. My dear gentle ladles and men, women in black rural communities are still far from overcoming challenges and obstacles of gender equality and sustainable empowerment and togetherness because they still struggle and fail to overcome the domestic and gender based violence as a result of: Limited, unaffordable or no bus or taxi services; Slow response times by police and ambulance services; Poor and expensive telecommunication services; Large distance to public versus child care if travel is necessary; Few support services for abused women and children; No safe accommodation for women if they need to live their homes; High rate of unemployment and underdevelopment, resulting in women struggling to pay for necessities , travel, accommodation or costs of separation or relocation; Application forms for protection order are only available in two languages i.e. English and Afrikaans; Furthermore, forms are not available in Braille and sign language interpreters are not readily available in courts; There is no provision for traditional courts to issue protection orders; despite the fact that there is currently about 1 500 customary courts operating in South Africa; and Finally, customary law lack specific rules dealing with gender based violence. Ladies and gentlemen, we cannot say we are free when some women are still humiliated by those who are suppose to render social services to them e.g. institutions, like magistrate offices to name a few, which to our knowledge are official custodian of law, are the ones that are ridiculing and humiliating our beloved sisters and daughters. Women are supposed to claim maintenance on behalf of their children from their biological fathers. Good people, instead of them receiving such type of a service, they are made to queue for months and are told that whatever maintenance money received is send to Pretoria first before it can be redistributed after some months. Ladies and gentlemen should we say we are free? As women we are entitled to all human rights as stipulated in the Constitution of South Africa. We should be treated with respect and dignity regardless of colour and creed. Dear women LET’S KNOW OURSELVES. Life needs people who are not afraid to take decisions and remain firm. We cannot live behind masks for the rest of our lives. Ladies let’s take the spirit of 1956 of togetherness. That march of 1956 was initiated by a coalition of women’s political groups under the banner of the Federation of South African Women. My dearest gentle ladies and men allow me to conclude my speech by quoting Tata Dr Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, who refers his life of imprisonment as: “ A LONG WALK TO FREEDOM” Parallel to this, it has been a long expectation for us as South African women to make an impact in our political setting. For us to succeed we need to have a spirit of togetherness, the “we-feeling” and unity. Referring to politics in particular, Women’s Day is supposed to commemorate the women’s march of 1956, but the political activism we see today is but a shadow of 1956 spirit, let alone the existence of the Federation of South African Women coalition. The march was a significant step towards gender equality in South Africa, but, as we continue to face more challenges, the torch has been passed on to the women and men of today to work together towards sustainable women empowerment and gender equality. I thank you.
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08 Oct, 2013
Bestow the Freedom of the City of Johannesburg on the leaders of the 1956 Women’s March
Address by Cllr Thandi Nontenja, UDM Councillor in the City of Johannesburg at Special Council Meeting to Bestow the Freedom of the City of Johannesburg on the leaders of the 1956 Women’s March on 15 August 2013 Council Chambers Madam Speaker Executive Mayor Members of the Mayoral Committee Mama Sophie de Bruyn Families of the recipients Fellow Councillors Ladies and Gentlemen The United Democratic Movement (UDM) joins you in saluting the brave women who marched in 1956 to petition against legislation that required Africans to carry the pass during the apartheid era. We are to this day amazed by what those twenty thousand women did as they marched to the Union Buildings at a point in time when people went to jail for less. Their march was a significant step towards gender equality in South Africa. Under the inspired leadership of people such as Helen Joseph, Rahima Moosa, Lilian Ngoyi and Sophia Williams-de Bruyn, the women of South Africa showed their resilience, political will and female solidarity. As we celebrate Women’s Month, we must however admit that we have not achieved our mission, because gender bias and discrimination remain an unfortunate factor in our country. Today’s women are faced with much more daunting challenges like HIV/AIDS, domestic violence, poverty, rape, etc. Unless as South Africans we take drastic steps to correct the social ills that are glaring in the various sectors of our society, the struggle of these courageous women will be in vain. As women leaders we must take responsibility for the legacy left by these courageous women of 1956 and blaze the trail for those who come after us. We cannot disappoint the women who passed the baton to us; and we cannot fail our girls and their daughters. Tomorrow, as we commemorate the Marikana Massacre; we share the pain and anguish of our sisters and daughters who lost their loved ones. We hope that justice will eventually prevail. The UDM is in support of bestowing the Freedom of the City of Johannesburg on bomama Helen Josephs, Rahima Moosa, Sophia Williams de Bruyn, Lillian Ngoyi. Wathint’ abafazi wathint’ imbokodo Thank you.
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08 Oct, 2013
Marikana Commemoration
Address by Mr Bantu Holomisa, MP (UDM President) on Marikana Commemoration on Friday, 16 August 2013 at Marikana Programme Director, Church and union leaders, Leaders of political parties, Mining management, Community leaders, The workers and people of Marikana 16 AUGUST 2012 I stand here and I remember when we heard the terrible news of what happened on this very soil on 16 August 2012. Indeed the South African Council of Churches (SACC), under the leadership of Bishop Jo Seoka, and the leaders of political parties visited this community to pay our respects and to hear what it was that happened. You will recall that we left here with the advice that the SACC should not leave this community to fend for itself and we are thankful that you have stayed your course. We again plead with you to not leave this area without having made sure that this community has access to proper housing, schools, roads, clinics, crèches and above all until the citizens of this country go to an Economic Indaba that will address the skewed distribution of resources which have benefited a selected few and only some regions. If we had strong civil society, after Government’s botched handling of this situation, we would have had a plan of action in place, with specified deadlines, that insured that this community received the care and services they need to have an acceptable standard of living and the disputed funding of legal representatives would not be an issue. WE MUST NEVER HAVE A REPEAT OF THIS TRAGEDY If it had not been for the harsh reality, one would not have believed that we lived in a new South Africa where it was possible for nearly 80 South Africans to be injured, and 44 to die, in one day, in a conflict between a people and their government. A year has passed and this community still has a long way to go to find healing. You still have much heartache, frustration and disappointment to process, because of not only what happened on that fateful day, but also what happened thereafter. This community, and those who find employment on the mines across South Africa, have however proved that we as a Nation have an innate strength and resilience. You have shown that we will not be defeated by that which is wrong; that we can rise from the ash, dust and grime; and that we are willing to work to find mutual trust and a brighter future for all our people. To the families, friends and colleagues of those who were injured and had lost their lives, it is not only important that we find peace in our hearts, but also peace in this community and in the workplace. I hope that all the people who form part of this community, employer and worker alike, will soon find each other. We therefore congratulate the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (Amcu) and the mine management for their continued willingness to engage with one another to talk about a solution that will benefit all. CONCLUSION We will never forget what happened here, but I am sure we can all agree that some good must come from this tragedy. Things must change for the better. On behalf of the United Democratic Movement, I commiserate with those who were left behind and we appeal to all concerned, to work hard to find common ground and above all, let us never-ever have a repeat of what happened on 16 August 2012. I thank you.
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08 Oct, 2013
WSU crisis Stakeholder Meeting
Address by Mr Bantu Holomisa, MP ( UDM President) at the WSU crisis Stakeholder Meeting at Mthatha High School Stadium on Monday, 02 September 2013 Programme Director and Ladies and Gentlemen, At the funeral of the late Mr Tsengwa in Willowvale a few years ago, Bishop Mbethe expressed feelings of great sadness about the dreadful state and poor quality of our education in the Eastern Cape. His lamentation was prompted by the continuous poor matric performance of the Eastern Cape Province. He summed up the importance of education in the Eastern Cape as follows and I quote: “The Eastern Cape is not endowed with gold, but its gold has over the always been the good quality of its education.” I guess it is precisely because of this reason that the people of this Province heeded our call to meet here today to discuss and find solutions to the challenges facing Walter Sisulu University (WSU). WSU challenges are as old as our democracy itself. This university has long-standing problems, which have been allowed to recur ceaselessly. I therefore hope that our discussions today will go a long way towards identifying and solving some, if not all, of WSU’s challenges. You will recall that this meeting is an outcome of requests for my intervention from concerned parents, students, members of the public and other stakeholders about the challenges at WSU. After I was inundated with these requests, I wrote a letter to President Zuma, asking him to set up a task team to look into the crisis at WSU. President Zuma is however yet to respond to my letter. The inordinate amount of time he is taking to respond prompted me to propose today’s meeting. I took this decision because it appears that salary negotiations between the Department of Education and WSU management and employees have deadlocked and there seems to be no resolution in sight. Even last week, Mr Qonde, the Director General of the Department of Higher Education refused to alter the Department’s stance. Nor has he even tried to meet the workers halfway on their demands. His primary argument is that WSU management and employees are paid more than workers doing the same jobs at other universities. Needless to say, the crisis at WSU negatively affects the quality and access of students to education. This is more so when one considers Government’s bizarre decision to close the university. Has Government thought about what is going to happen to the students who come from other Provinces? I would therefore like to take this opportunity to urge all of us here today to working together towards finding short, medium and long-term solutions to the crisis at WSU. The role of authorities is particularly important in this regard. However, we should not hesitate to take the legal route should we sense a tinge of intransigence on their part. As we now ready ourselves for our discussions, we should do so mindful of the fact that we are not a labour court, nor are we a bargaining council. Ours is to help restore stability and normality at WSU. You will recall that I when I called for this meeting I proposed that it be presided by the South African Council of Churches (SACC). I am now going to hand over the meeting to them. But before I do so I wish to thank the UDM King Sabatha Dalindyebo (KSD) Municipality Councillors for sponsoring the marquee and the chairs for this event. I now hand the meeting over to the South African Council of Churches and in doing so wish the meeting the greatest success! I thank you.
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08 Oct, 2013
Tribute to the late Mr Krakrayo Simayile
Tribute by Mr Bantu Holomisa, MP (UDM President) to the late Mr Krakrayo Simayile, a loyal UDM member, at the Langa Sports Complex, Cape Town on Wednesday, 04 September 2013 Programme Director, The Simayile family; in particular his wife and children, UDM NEC Members, Provincial Executive Members of the UDM in the Western Cape, Distinguished guests, UDM Members, Ladies and gentlemen, On behalf of the United Democratic Movement (UDM), I wish to extend our heartfelt condolences to the family and friends of the late Mr Krakrayo Simayile. Our hearts go out to you during this difficult time. Mr Simayile or Noderi – as he was affectionately known – was a long-serving member of the UDM. He worked hard to build and grow the UDM in the Western Cape. He witnessed the murders and killings of many of our members in this Province for political reasons, without any of the perpetrators being brought to book. It is sad that today we have come here to pay our last respects to him under circumstances where there is no indication whether the people responsible for his death have been arrested. In hindsight, it would appear that we erred when we agreed to adopt the current provincial system instead of creating a unitary state. The general feeling is that the provincial system perpetuates the same evils we were trying to avoid in the former homeland system. Apart from being costly and being an administrative nightmare, the provincial system is constructed along the same racial and ethnic lines of the old homeland system. KwaZulu-Natal is for Zulus, while the Eastern Cape is for Xhosas, and so on. Here in the Western Cape you get an impression that National Government is treating this Province as if it is a federal state. For instance, I fail to understand how Ministers with national competence are always reluctant to monitor whether funds allocated to this Province are indeed being used for the betterment of the lives of the poor and previously disadvantaged communities. What stops President Zuma from calling a meeting with the Premier Zille and ask her to account for her government’s dismal service delivery performance in disadvantaged communities? It seems the governing parties are only content to use the poor and disadvantaged communities in this Province as voting cattle. One wonders whether the time has not come to review the current provincial system with a view depoliticise service delivery. I thank you.
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08 Oct, 2013
Minister Nzimande’s failure to address problems at the Walter Sisulu University is jeopardising futures of Eastern Cape youth
Member’s Statement by Mr Nqabayomzi Kwankwa, MP and UDM Deputy Secretary General, in the National Assembly regarding Minister Nzimande’s failure to address problems at the Walter Sisulu University is jeopardising futures of Eastern Cape youth The United Democratic Movement (UDM) is very concerned about the manner in which Government and the Minister of Higher Education are handling the crises at Walter Sisulu University (WSU). If not for the intervention of civil society, under the leadership of the South African Council of Churches, the current crisis would have escalated beyond the point of no return. It is an indictment of Minister Nzimande that our President had to dispatch Minister Chabane to clean up his colleague’s backyard. However, after an agreement was reached to end the seven-week long strike, we hear that classes are disrupted yet again. The allegations are that Government is negotiating in bad faith and has reneged on its promises. The UDM is of the view that the Minister Nzimande has failed to attend to the WSU challenges, which include, but are not limited to: Not intervening in the labour dispute timeously; Not reporting on his Departments’ turn-around strategy for the university; Whether its budget allocation is adequate; Whether the salaries of academics and workers are competitive; Allegations are that local companies are overlooked for university business; § Whether the merger of various institutions has delivered the desired results. The UDM calls on Government to urgently resolve the crises at WSU, because a day lost in a student’s learning, is a day too many.
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03 Dec, 2001
COMRADES IN CORRUPTION II
Arms Deal Joint Investigation Report – UDM’S reaction Who is fooling whom? “The troughs have changed however the pigs have remained the same” Background Many public statements on the Arms Deal saga assert that Parliament approved the Defence Review and thereby approved the decision to purchase military equipment. ANC ministers and –politicians have made this assertion frequently during the Arms Deal investigation. However, it is fundamentally and demonstrably inaccurate. The inaccuracy has no bearing whatsoever on the allegations of impropriety against the “comrades in corruption”. The experts argue that the implications relate to policy, parliamentary mandates and the debate around state expenditure priorities. The Defence Review was conducted in terms of the overarching policy framework of the White Paper on Defence, approved by Cabinet and Parliament in 1996. The White Paper proclaims that national security is no longer a predominantly military and police problem. It encompasses the consolidation of democracy, economic development and the achievement of social justice. At the heart of this new approach is a “paramount concern with the security of people”. The White Paper goes on to declare that the greatest threats to the security of our people are socio-economic problems like poverty, unemployment, poor education and the lack of housing and adequate social services. In the absence of any foreseeable external military threat, there is “a compelling need to reallocate state resources to the Reconstruction and Development Programme”. The challenge facing the Department of Defence is “to rationalise the SANDF and contain military spending without undermining the country’s core defence capability”. We do not dispute the fact that the Defence Review contains a force design that lists the type and quantity of military hardware deemed necessary for the SANDF to fulfil its functions. The list includes submarines, corvettes and the other weapons systems that form part of the procurement package. However, the Review describes the force design as a “vision” that will change over time. The final detail concerning the type and quantity of weaponry to be acquired will “inevitably deviate from the vision” and “such deviations will be subject to parliamentary oversight”. Notwithstanding the binding agreement, President Mbeki’s Cabinet reneged on it and induced government to underwrite the R29.9 billion Arms Procurement Deal behind Parliament’s back. This has now escalated to R66 billion, and still mounting. The Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel signed foreign loan agreements and credit guarantees early this year without the approval of Parliament by way of a special or other resolution. The Hansard of Parliament reflects that no such approval was sought or obtained. For the Cabinet to approve such agreements without the approval of Parliament is unlawful. Even the Public Finance Management Act of 1999 states that it prohibits the State from borrowing money or issuing guarantees without specific authority from Parliament. Given these qualifications, parliamentary approval of the Defence Review in 1998 cannot be construed as a mandate to buy weapons. Parliament was not asked to sanction the Arms Deal at the time of the Review or subsequently. It has exercised its oversight function only in relation to the charges of corruption and conflict of interest surrounding the deal, after the Auditor-General’s Special Review Report was tabled in September 2000. Moreover, the Review acknowledges that “national priorities and budgetary restrictions place constraints on defence expenditure”. It accepts that the force design vision is thus unaffordable in the short to medium term. At the time of the Review, Parliament consequently had no expectation of increased military spending. Indeed, the Review anticipates that annual defence expenditure between 1998/9 and 2005/6 will remain constant at R9.7 billion in 1998 rand-value. This target now appears likely to be exceeded substantially. In the many ways as described above, the R66 billion arms package is inconsistent with national policy on security and defence endorsed by Cabinet and Parliament. The package is in fact more likely to reduce than enhance security. This is undoubtedly true for millions of people in terms of human security: money spent on weaponry is money that could otherwise have been spent on education, housing, health, social services and policing. With few exceptions, the ministers responsible for these portfolios insisted in their budget speeches to Parliament that they were chronically underfunded. It cannot be argued convincingly that the package is needed for peace operations in Africa. It is hard to imagine how submarines and corvettes could play a significant role in containing civil wars, nor could we imagine these weapons being deployed in the shallow Great Lakes. Given Government’s policy emphasis on peacekeeping and reluctance in peace enforcement, fighter aircraft and other combat equipment are unlikely to be used often if at all. Department of Finance warnings The record escalation of the Arms Procurement costs from R29.9 billion to R66 billion to date was foreseen by the Department of Finance who warned the Cabinet as early as August 1999. It is disturbing that the Cabinet Committee responsible for the Arms Deal was warned by the Department of Finance in August 1999 about the risks involved in the deal. Four types of risks were identified namely: Exchange and Interest Rate Fluctuations, Counter-Trade as well as Macro-economic (growth) risks. These revelations raise a number of serious questions: a) Why did the Cabinet Committee take the decision to proceed with the deal knowing the risks involved? b) Why were the risks not explained to Parliament when the deal was announced? c) Why was the public not informed that the cost to the state would not be fixed at R29.9 billion? The Cabinet Committee, specifically Mr Mbeki, then Chairperson of the Committee, as well as Ministers Manuel and Erwin, need to answer these questions. Ignoring the warnings of the downside potential of any project places the full responsibility on the decision-makers; they must face the full consequences of their decision. Opposition parties, religious groupings and civil society at large questioned the logic of such staggering expenditure on weapons of war in peacetime when there was such a backlog of social delivery reflecting the historical imbalances of the old order. In their defence the Cabinet argued that the Procurement deal would generate 65 000 jobs and R104 billion in offsets (investment and counter-trade). If arms procurement is such a lucrative undertaking one wonders why developing countries do not embark on arms purchases in order to make more money and create more jobs. The people in the driving seat of this deal are the Cabinet subcommittee chaired by the President. The awarding of contracts for the supply of defence equipment in this deal was not done through the normal tender process. It was all done behind closed doors by the said cabinet subcommittee. This lack of transparency has been characterised by questionable selection of contractors where one contract for the supply of naval equipment was awarded to a more expensive German contractor to the exclusion of a Spanish bidder who could supply it for much less. Another glaring example of irregularity in the tendering process was when the committee changed the tendering procedures mid-stream in order to give bidding advantage to a more expensive British Aerospace contractor over a more affordable but effective Italian aircraft one for the supply of military aircraft. The media and public furore arising out of these scandals caused the Auditor-General to review the Arms Deal and the manner in which, it had been handled by the various stakeholders. In September 2000, he tabled a Special Review Report in Parliament, which revealed suspicions of conflict of interest in the awarding of tenders. Consequently the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), the parliamentary watchdog, after deliberations, endorsed the need for an in-depth investigation of the Arms Deal, especially the tendering process. Through Parliament’s 14th Report, SCOPA recommended that the investigation be undertaken by the Heath Special Investigative Unit (Heath SIU), the Auditor-General, the Public Protector and the Directorate of Public Prosecutions. However, as a result of panic, the ANC big-wigs, led by the Speaker of Parliament argued that SCOPA had no mandate to sub-contract its work to outside agencies and effectively overruled SCOPA and hijacked the responsibility and accountability for the investigation. The Heath SIU, was summarily dissolved and the investigation delegated to the remaining three Agencies with no Terms of Reference known to the public, despite our calls for such. Hereunder is an extract from the SCOPA 14th Report dated 30/10/2000 submitted to Parliament, which speaks for itself. It is important to note that SCOPA is composed of representatives from all political parties including the ANC, which has the majority representation. “After the National Assembly had referred the Auditor-General’s report to this Committee, the Committee received a large amount of unsolicited evidence, of varying plausibility, from a number of different sources. Amongst the numerous allegation and assertions were those which reflected common ground to a significant degree. It is on the basis of this, and the Committee’s perception of the other issues raised in this Report, as well as the need to prove or disprove once and for all the allegations which cause damage to perceptions of the government, that the Committee recommends an independent and expert forensic investigation. In this regard, the Committee will prepare a brief for such investigation which stipulates particular assertions that ought to be investigated, while placing no limitation on the scope of the investigation. In noting the complex and cross-cutting nature of the areas to be investigated, the Committee feels that the investigation would be best served by combining a number of areas of investigative expertise and a number of differing areas of legal competence and authority. It therefore recommends that an exploratory meeting convened by the Committee, be held within two weeks of the tabling of this Report in National Assembly. The Auditor-General, the Heath SIU, the Public Protector, the Investigating Directorate of Serious Economic Offences, and any other appropriate investigative body should be invited, so that the best combination of skills, legal mandates and resources can be found for such an investigation. Once this is established, the Committee will issue an investigation brief to the team for its input. Also, the chosen investigating body will be requested to report on its progress at regular intervals to the Committee, as well as at the conclusion of its work, in order that this might be included in the Committee’s final report to the National Assembly on the matter.” As a result of the Speaker’s meddling in SCOPA’s business, ostensibly at the instance of the ANC party bosses, the ANC component in SCOPA reneged and withdrew their support for the 14th Report which they had previously co-authored, and which was unanimously endorsed by the National Assembly. The situation became ugly when the Deputy President and his Cabinet colleagues publicly berated SCOPA and thereby undermined Parliament’s decision. The Executive interference led to a trail of incidents, which undermined the credibility of any investigation, conducted at its instance i.e.: a) SCOPA’s independence and effectiveness as a watchdog on tax-payer’s money were severely compromised; b) The Heath SIU, which had more powers than the other three Agencies, was withdrawn from the investigation and subsequently dissolved. c) Parliament and SCOPA were not informed of the Terms of Reference of the pending investigation. d) Consequently the investigation had no public legitimacy and the outcome could be predicted. Despite the President and his Cabinet’s protestations that the deal was above aboard, even using the public broadcaster to mount this propaganda, the patriotic media and opposition parties continued their independent probe and exposed many wrong-doings which are now public knowledge, e.g., it emerged that one senior defence public official was implicated in influencing the awarding of a contract to a company in which his brother was a director. Some contractors had links with key political figures in South Africa and selected prime contractors were twinned to local ANC-aligned subcontractors. It also emerged that European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), a subsidiary of Mercedes Benz doled out expensive motor vehicles at massive discounts to prominent Parliamentarians, the Chiefs of the Defence Force, and Airforce, Government Officials and other public figures. It’s not yet clear what the motive for this bonanza was. Neither does the report of the three Agencies mention these incidents in detail. On realising that the executive had hijacked the investigative process against the wishes of Parliament, the UDM questioned the conduct of the Speaker on the Arms Deal and recommended to her on the 14th May 2001 some Terms of Reference for the investigation and also to the three Agencies on the 18th July 2001. These are quoted hereunder: Terms of Reference a) The probe must be officially gazetted with clear Terms of Reference and time frames. b) In the light of further revelations of the possible proliferation of irregularities in the entire deal, the investigation must go beyond examining sub-contracting procedures and cover the entire arms procurement transaction including the main contractors. What was the motive for the Cabinet Committee to opt for a British Aerospace expensive purchase against the advice of Defence Force and arms procurement negotiating team. c) Attention must be drawn to the sub-committee, which was chaired by the President, which apparently positioned itself as the “Tender Board” in the allocation of contracts with the view to bringing clarity regarding its role in the whole saga. d) The need to empower the investigating agencies with the same authority previously enjoyed by the Heath Special Investigative Unit i.e. powers to cancel irregular contracts, etc. e) Were any monies paid to individuals or political groups by tendering companies in order to facilitate the granting of contracts to themselves, such as in the case of British Aerospace which paid the ANC an amount of R5 million just prior to the awarding tenders? f) Special focus be made on the possibility of individuals or groups holding public office being beneficiaries of monies or shares from international companies which have been awarded contracts. g) The role played by individuals in the sub-committee chaired by the President in the awarding of contracts and whether any of them received any payments or shares. h) Are there any family members of the Mbeki sub-committee or close associates benefiting from the awarding of these contracts? i) Whether the Black empowerment companies who were awarded sub-contracts have the capacity to perform or were mere fronts for the main contractors? j) What were the motives for EADS in subsidising 30 motor vehicles sold to politicians, Armscor/Denel personnel, civil servants and Defence personnel as they have publicly confessed? k) Whether the executive deliberately misled Parliament and the public about the true cost of the arms procurement exercise when they quoted it at R30 billion when in reality it is +R50 billion to date. l) According to the Defence Review, R9.7 billion was focused for 1999 – 2006 financial years, as approved by Parliament. Who authorised the R30 billion expenditure? Did Parliament endorse this expenditure? Whether the Defence Review, which identified the Defence needs which culminated in the current arms procurement was a genuine analysis of our national Defence needs or a smokescreen to cover self-enrichment by individuals in the ruling party circles. i. With special reference to the estimated R4 billion which ANC members who own sub-contracted companies in the arms procurement deal will earn and in particular the role played by the former Defence Minister, Mr J Modise and General L.A. Moloi in establishing the following companies, as suggested by financial media: - Are these companies African Defence Systems (ADS) - Futuristic Business Solutions - Applied Logistics Engineering - Nkobi Investments - Temoso Technology - M.K. Technologies - X Cell - Dynamic Cables ii. conduits for channelling arms procurement funds back to ANC coffers? This must be investigated. iii. Were these companies lobbied by the main international contractors who were awarded procurement contracts? Were they paid any monies by them and if so how much? iv. Did these sub-contractors lobby any members of Parliament and ministers? If so did they pay them any monies and how much? The Auditor-General on behalf of the Agencies responded and refused to consider our Terms of Reference and boasted that his office had the capacity to carryout the investigation. The Speaker did not even respond to our call. Instead she threatened to sue the President of the UDM and tabled his letter in Parliament charging that it undermined her integrity as Speaker of Parliament. Government censorship of the audit report??????? Our worst fears that the investigation lacked credibility were confirmed. The Auditor-General secretly, without the knowledge of SCOPA submitted the report of the investigation to the Cabinet, which was an integral component of the investigation. The media exposed this unusual step by the Auditor-General. He confirmed this when he justified his action on the grounds of apartheid era legislation, the Special Defence Account Act, which mandated him to submit the report to the Cabinet for “security reasons.” Clearly that report was edited or sanitised in the interests of “security”. Parliament, SCOPA and the public are in the dark as to what was excised from the report for “security reasons.” The tabled report does not show that any forensic audit of the banking accounts of the individuals and contractors being investigated was done, despite the earlier undertaking by the Auditor-General that this would be done. This apparent omission leads one to the conclusion that this forensic audit could be part of the excised report. In evaluating the Arms Procurement saga, it is important to note that the Apartheid-era Special Defence Account Act, which empowers the government to censor the report of any investigation was used by Chippy Shaik at the Cabinet Sub-Committee’s instance to censor certain aspects of the Auditor-General’s report to Parliament which sparked off the investigation of the Arms Deal. This report enabled Chippy Shaik, a Defence procurement official to influence the awarding of the contract to his brother’s company, according to reports. Notwithstanding the apparent cover up by the Investigating Agencies, the media continues to probe and reveal irregularities which leave us with no doubt that there was large-scale wrongdoing in the Arms Deal process, and the Cabinet has used its powers and archaic apartheid-era laws to mount a monumental cover-up of these irregularities. The invoking of the Special Defence Account Act for censoring the Auditor-General’s Special Review report in 2000 set a pattern which has been repeated with regard to the current report of the investigating Agencies. For example, prior to the tabling of the Auditor-General’s Special Review Report in September 2000, which had already been censored by the executive, the Minister of Defence Mosiuoa Lekota had given the Auditor-General carte blanche authority to investigate any irregularities in the Arms procurement deal. He was to access all relevant documents without hindrance. However, the then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, as chairman of the Cabinet sub-committee charged with overseeing the Arms acquisition, intervened to reverse Lekota’s decision. In the letter of the 28th September 2000 the defence ministry’s Brigadier-General Keith Snowball wrote to the Auditor-General advising him that it had been brought to the attention of Minister Lekota that a decision had been taken prior to his appointment as Minister of Defence that only the Cabinet sub-committee had authority to approve the audit of documents regarding the Arms packages. This reversal of Lekota’s earlier carte blanche approval in effect required the Auditor-General to clear his Terms of Reference with the executive. From the onset President Mbeki’s sub-committee positioned itself to influence the course of the investigation by establishing an “audit steering committee” on 29 November 1999, on which sat people suspected of wrongdoing in the Arms Deal, including Chippy Shaik. Notwithstanding the independence conferred on the office of the Auditor-General by the Constitution, the Auditor-General has allowed himself to be swayed by the executive and compromise the integrity of his office by allowing members of the Auditor-General’s office to serve in the Cabinet appointed Audit Steering Committee. Chippy Shaik has now become the focus of blame for conflict of interest, with justification. However his culpability must be seen in the context of a Cabinet that had a vested interest to see an outcome that suited it in the investigation. In other words Chippy Shaik enjoyed Cabinet backing to do what he did. The latter share the responsibility for sanitising both reports and deceiving the public. This scenario has echoes of the Apartheid-era info-scandal of the Roodies and Mulders. Chippy Shaik may well go the way of a sacrificial lamb and carry the sins of his masters to the execution block as Herschell Roodie did. However, the Nationalist government of the day had stirrings of conscience, which prompted Mulder and John Vorster subsequently to resign from their posts. One wonders if our leaders will have the moral courage to emulate this historical example. Time will tell. Auditor-General’s role The conduct of the Auditor-General in this episode is cause for concern. He refused to heed the appeals of Parliament and opposition parties and SCOPA that the four Agencies including the Heath SIU draw up the Terms of Reference or the Brief of the investigation. He openly supported the Cabinet in excluding the Unit from the investigation. We now know that he allowed himself to be persuaded by Chippy Shaik to remove certain aspects of the original Auditor-General Special Review report of September 2000 to Parliament, as a result of which sanitation, arose Chippy Shaik’s conflict of interest. He has again defended the submission of the Report of the three Agencies to Cabinet for perusal prior to tabling, in terms of the apartheid-era Special Defence Account Act, for “security reasons”. He further denies that Cabinet has made any “substantial” changes to the original report. That remains to be seen. SCOPA has been kept in the dark about the progress of the investigation despite appeals that they be kept informed. Members of SCOPA and Members of Parliament were not implicated in the Arms Deal, and therefore there could have been no justification for withholding information about the investigation from them. Yet the Cabinet to whom he submitted the reports are themselves material factors for investigation. The Auditor-General conceded to Parliament and SCOPA that there were merits for the investigation of the Arms Deal. He was mandated by them to carry out this investigation and remained in principle and morally accountable to them. Instead he abused their trust, turned his back on them and kept the probe a private and confidential affair which he shared with the Cabinet. There is only one conclusion; the Auditor-General has betrayed the trust of Parliament and SCOPA. The Speaker of the National Assembly castigated the Chairman of SCOPA for identifying the four Agencies to investigate the Arms Deal on the grounds that SCOPA had no powers to sub-contract to these Agencies. It was the same Honourable Speaker who recently held a celebratory press conference inside Parliament with the very Agencies, which she barred SCOPA to deal with. The whole episode is a farce; hence the UDM termed the outcome of the probe “a celebrated palace verdict”. Findings of the probe The investigating Agencies have been hasty to exonerate the government from any wrongdoing in the awarding of the contracts. Yet they concede that there were irregularities in the awarding process. In view of the fact that it was the Cabinet Committee, which awarded the contracts, there is a glaring contradiction in their findings. The tendering cannot be found faulty and the instrument responsible for that process be found faultless. We now scrutinise some of their findings hereunder: a) Fighter Aircraft. The SANDF experts and technical committees who evaluated the tenders for the fighter aircraft were unanimous in recommending the Italian Contractor Aeromacchi as a preferred bidder. This was despite the then Defence Minister Modise’s mid-stream injunction that cost should not be used as a criteria in selecting a bidder. The minutes of the meeting on 30 April 1998 at the technical committee, record that Defence Minister Joe Modise told the gathering that “the most expensive option was not necessarily the best option”. He instructed the defence acquisition staff to bear this in mind during the selection process. The acquisition staff followed the normal prescribed rules in doing their evaluation and selection. They used the costed criteria and chose Aeromacchi over the British Aerospace bidder. However, according to the UDM’s research, Mbeki’s Cabinet Sub-Committee intervened when British Aerospace lost the bid, and instructed the acquisition staff to determine both a costed and a non-costed option in their selection. The uncosted option would be deemed to have other weightier non-cost considerations, which would make a company a preferred bidder. After determining both the costed and uncosted options the Italian Aeromacchi still won the tender ahead of British Aerospace. SANDF experts used objective criteria to arrive at this decision. The joint Airforce and Armscor technical team still preferred the Italian trainer even after considering both options. Cabinet, through Chippy Shaik imposed the selection of British Aerospace and justified this intervention on the much questionable superiority of the British fighter trainer – which claim is hotly contested by the technical experts who obviously have the technical expertise lacking in the Cabinet, which imposed their choice. A Cabinet Committee chaired by Mr Mbeki opted for the more expensive British Hawk on the basis of superior offset. However, it is reliably known that the list of counter-trade offsets attached to the British Aerospace final tender proposal in April 1998 was not the same as the list which was put before the Cabinet, on which they are supposed to have based their decision. The Agencies themselves in their findings raise serious questions about British Aerospace’s industrial offset offerings and the way in which they were evaluated. It is common knowledge that British Aerospace gave out substantial cash inducements (R5 million) to the ANC just before the Arms Deal tenders were issued. The UDM made reference to this transaction when it submitted its suggested Terms of Reference to the Agencies. They now argue that the Cabinet used their prerogative in making their selection, despite the compelling evidence against their decision as stated above and the Agencies’ own serious reservations about the Cabinet evaluation criteria. The Agencies’ position in this report is untenable and raises our concerns about the integrity of their report. b) Corvettes. The Agencies further exonerate the government from any wrongdoing on the Corvette deal despite their own findings. None of the bidders on corvettes complied with the key criteria affecting their financing, among others, with the exception of Bazan of Spain which lost the bid to Frigate Consortium, which should have been disqualified for not providing the required guarantee. The report shows that Bazan would have beaten German Frigate Consortium, had it not been for the high scores awarded to the German Company by the Department of Trade and Industry, specifically on the non-defence industrial participation component of the German bid. The German bid of R8.5 billion won the day over the Spanish one of only R1 billion. The non-defence industrial participation which tilted the scale in favour of the German Company is the non-starter at Coega Industrial Development Zone (IDZ). During the tender period the non defence industrial participation entailed an offer by the German Ferrostal steel group to build a R6.5 billion integrated steel plant at Coega. Immediately after the tender was awarded this figure was scaled down to R1.2 billion. Recently, Business Day reported that Ferrostal’s often revised and down scaled plans now stand at R860 million. To compound the problem, former Minister Joe Modise who just before he retired awarded the contract for the supply of Corvettes to the German Company in return for the Ferrostal’s involvement at Coega is now the beneficiary in that transaction through his chairmanship and shareholding in Khutele Project which has been awarded a contract to conduct an integrated transport study at Coega. There is no doubt he had a vested interest in awarding the contract to the German Company. All this damming evidence of impropriety has been ignored by the Agencies who cursorily dismiss this important transaction and exonerate the government from wrong-doing. c) Submarines. The Agencies’ Report finds that the German Submarine Consortium, which won the bid did not make the grade where its defence offsets were concerned and should not have been awarded the contract, at the first round. It says Armscor’s legal division submitted a legal opinion that the Germans had “failed materially to meet the essential requirements of the defence offsets”. This opinion was not passed on to the selection panel. The investigators concede that Chippy Shaik and a colleague allowed the bidders who did not comply to get their house in order before the next round. However to the Agencies all is forgiven. d) Cost of the Arms Deal. The Agencies and their consultants are critical of the Cabinet’s affordability assessment of the Arms purchase because they ignored the currency fluctuations. The contracts, they say, are long term and the final cost would be subjected to the vagaries of the rand. They say the forecasts on which the government study was based were too optimistic. This assessment is in stark contrast to the exoneration of no wrongdoing by the Cabinet. There is no question that the Arms purchase debt continues to escalate especially with the fast depreciation of the rand against the major currencies of our trading partners. The final figure after 20 years of the duration of the debt is anybody’s guess. Armscor estimate is R66 billion. Yet it could be much more than that. The disturbing feature of this transaction, apart from channelling scarce resources to the purchase of arms in peacetime at the expense of social priorities, it does not quantify with any certainty the trade and investment offsets which have been so liberally used as arguments to justify the awarding of tenders. Ultimately, according to some authorities, the finance and interest costs will be born by the taxpayer as part of the budget deficit. Do we really need this extravagance? We submit hereunder Armscor’s breakdown of the original Arms Deal purchase cost as at 18 November 1999 exchange rate, which excluded financing costs amounting to 49% of the procurement costs e) Sub-contracting – your right to know Government has been voluble in denying any responsibility for main sub-contractors who have been linked to the tenderers who have been awarded contracts. This is strange indeed because it was one of government’s pre-conditions to would-be offshore suppliers that they would have to subcontract to local empowerment contractors. This is government policy. The Government denies that it got involved in choosing sub-contractors, so it could not have been influenced by the fact that several sub-contractors benefited relatives, ANC, friends of the ANC leadership and government officials. Government claims that prime (main) contractors were responsible for selection of sub-contractors. However, records will prove in the case of naval combat suite, that Armscor, a government institution, issued tenders for the corvettes and stated that with a few specified exceptions, South African companies (empowerment companies included) were going to supply the components. Foreign bidders for the ship contract were supplied with a list of the nominated sub-contractors and what equipment they would be providing. Even the price had been fixed ±R1,47 billion. The navy did not thumb-suck this figure. Nominated local contractors had provided detailed cost estimates for the sub-systems. These were further audited and approved by the Navy/Armscor team. For example, after the German Frigate Consortium (GFC) was chosen, it then joined forces with Thomson/African Defence Systems (ADS). The price of the combat suite suddenly went up dramatically from R1,47 billion to R3.9 billion. This prompted Captain (now rear admiral) Johnny Kamerman, to write an angry letter in March 1999 to the German Frigate Consortium complaining that the ADS quote for the combat suite was nearly double that tendered by the South African supplier. But the prime contractors simply blamed the price increase on the risk premium they had added for using South African contractors. In effect, ADS was able to massively inflate prices, trading on the strong political commitment both to ADS and its well-connected comrade empowerment partners and to deal with Germany. Do you want to tell us that Thabo Mbeki and Trevor Manuel, Minister of Finance, were not aware of this anomaly? Never! An example: the price quoted by ADS for one subsystem was R64.73 million. But, when forced by the Navy to quote against another bidder, ADS quickly dropped their price to R29.65 million – less than half their original bid, but still higher than the other company’s tender, which was for R26.43 million. ADS got the tender. Another example: The price quoted by ADS for another subsystem was R46.9 million. Again, when forced by the Navy to quote against a competitor, ADS dropped their price to R18.9 million. This time the competitor won the contract, with a quote of R14.1 million. One of the subsystems on the corvette was the contract to supply the massive gears which form the link between engine and propellers. There were two bids: the one from Maag, the other from Renk, both foreign. The GFC chose Maag, as did the Navy’s technical team. (The Navy team formally informed the GFC of their choice in June 1999). Then Armscor wanted Renk. In August Armscor wrote to the GFC stating that it wished to “notify GFC of the importance of Reumech Gear Ratio to Armscor and the Department of Defence.” Reumech Gear Ratio, a local company which was in the process of being sold to British defence firm Vickers, relied on its profitable relationship with Renk. So here a selection made by the preferred prime contractor and formally endorsed by the Project Control Board (consisting of the Navy, the Department of Defence (DoD) and Armscor), was later overturned by the latter – so much for the government’s contention of no involvement in the selection of subcontractors! Despite the fact that Maag upped their industrial participation offer and offered to source some of the work from Gear Ratio, the nod went to Renk. Could it be possible that the decision had something to do with the fact that a company called DGD Technologies (co-directors: Diliza Mji and Moeletsi Mbeki) was negotiating for a stake in Reumech/Vickers? Dr Diliza Mji is a Director of Armscor and Chairperson of British Aerospace South Africa. Unfortunately , these questions would never be answered unless we appoint an Independent Judicial Commission of Inquiry. These sub-contractors are manned by ANC activists. They were clearly hand-picked by the ANC leadership in government. What is of serious concern is that it was known by government that these contractors do not have the technological expertise to handle the high tech that comes with modern defence equipment. Yet at the time of winning the tenders they were scheduled to earn ±R4 billion from the deal. How was it expected they would perform without the necessary skills? Were they mere conduits through whom the government wants to channel funds to the ANC? There is no other possible explanation for this clumsy arrangement. Government cannot bury their heads in the sand like ostriches. Government has erred and acted irresponsibly in allowing sub-contracts on such sensitive transactions to go to people over whom they have no control or responsibility, as they claim. Their denial of responsibility is an admission that they have placed the security of the country in the hands of unqualified people over whom they have no control. Disappearance of Cabinet documents Much has been said about the disappearance of Cabinet documents related to the Arms Deal in the wake of Chippy Shaik’s suspension and his brother Schabir Shaik’s arrest. The latter is a director of among others, Nkobi Investments. The Deputy President, Jacob Zuma has publicly admitted that they are long-standing comrades and close associates. Mr Zuma acknowledged that Schabir Shaik paid for his children’s’ education and that he was at one time his economic advisor in KwaZulu-Natal government. Schabir Shaik revealed in the media that his company channelled funds to ANC coffers. Quite clearly there is a cosy relationship between Schabir Shaik and the ANC. The disappearance of Cabinet documents, therefore cannot be an inexplicable mystery in the circumstances. It would have been in the interest of the ANC for Shaik to obtain inside information on competing tenders in order to have advantage over his competitors. His companies apparently are cash cows of the ANC. Indeed Schabir Shaik’s companies namely: · African Defence Systems, · Thompson-CSF Holdings, · Detexis Data, · Nkosi Investments (named after ANC’s late Treasurer General, Mr T Nkobi). These are some of the subcontracted companies who stand to benefit from the awarded tenders. While the Agencies have found a lot of flaws in the tendering process, and a litany of irregularities in the awarding of sub-contractors, there is a big omission in their probe however. There is no forensic audit of bank accounts of these sub-contractors to determine their financial viability, and the way funds are channelled. Is this a deliberate omission? Had the Agencies conducted forensic auditing of bank accounts of these sub-contractors, it would have exposed the channelling of taxpayers’ monies to the ANC coffers as admitted by Schabir Shaik. Outstanding questions to the investigation agencies UDM has studied the Joint Investigation Report and consequently will participate in Parliamentary deliberations in this regard. In light of these glaring deviations from the legal procedures in the Arms acquisition process and the joint investigation’s own acknowledgement irregularities in this exercise, UDM, as part of its contribution to the corrective effort by parliament and public we represent, submits for clarification the list of questions that appear hereunder, and these questions will be posed to the three Agencies: a) What was the Joint Investigation Team’s Terms of Reference, and who provided these? b) Has the “Special Review by the Auditor-General on the Strategic Defence Packages” (September 2000) been shown before its publication and tabling in Parliament to: i) Members of the Executive ii) The Chief of Acquisitions (Mr Chippy Shaik) and have they changed anything in the draft shown to them? c) The media reports that an “Audit Steering Committee” was established by the Executive: i) What was the role of this committee in the entire arms procurement exercise? ii) At what stage did its operations begin and when will/did they stop? iii) Did the committee influence the Auditor-General’s Review of September 2000 prior to its tabling in Parliament? iv) What are the powers of this committee? d) Did the Investigating Agencies interrogate the Cabinet subcommittee on the whole Arms acquisition deal? e) Having conducted the investigation and discovered certain abnormalities, on what did the Joint Investigation Agencies base their absolution of the government from any wrongdoing? f) In view of the fact that the Joint Investigation Agencies were delegated by Parliament in terms of the 14th Report what authority do the Agencies have to absolve the government from wrongdoing even before they have reported to their principal (Parliament)? g) Why did the Agencies show their report to the Executive without first consulting Parliament and SCOPA to whom they were accountable? Why did they go public with their report without first briefing SCOPA? h) Has the “Joint Investigation Report into the Strategic Defence Packages” (November 2001) been shown in a draft form to the President, any member of the Cabinet or any government official, before its release on 14 November 2001? Was any fact, finding or recommendation changed, adjusted, added or removed from such draft report, and if so, what are the details? i) Is it true that the Joint Investigation Report has found that there was no wrongdoing by government and its members in the Arms deal, why were there such frantic steps taken to exclude the Heath SIU from the investigation, involvement by executive (Deputy President Zuma) in the work of the parliamentary committee SCOPA, and unprecedented interference by the Speaker in this investigation? j) From the total of eight serious allegations listed in the Joint Investigation Report, no less than six allegations are still under investigation. How can government claim it has been vindicated? Against this background, who has decided and for what reason, that the Joint Investigation Report is a final report and not an interim report or is Parliament expected to rubberstamp this decision? k) Did the investigation team investigate the allegations that British Aerospace paid a substantial inducement to the governing party? If not, why not? l) The report found that the Chief of Acquisitions, Mr Chippy Shaik, breached a series of procedures and rules and allowed a serious conflict of interest to contaminate his role in the decision-making process. Did any member of the executive know about this conflict of interest, and in what sense is anyone of them responsible for the actions of such a senior official? Where does the accountability of a minister stop for a public servant? Why are the actions of a government official in a government department different from the responsibilities of government? Why didn’t the report address this question of ministerial accountability? m) Will the contracts given to companies, as a result of Chippy Shaik’s behaviour, be cancelled? Who should take this decision? n) Why does the Report not recommend that government use the option open to it, based on adverse economic circumstances such as the drastically escalated cost of the arms deal, the risks involved related to industrial participation, etc, to postpone or cancel the second leg of the deal, namely to buy 19 Gripen light fighters and 12 Hawk jet trainer aircraft? o) Why was the Cabinet subcommittee the “clearing house” of the Strategic Defence Packages? Why did the Minister’s Committee intervene in certain circumstances, i.e. overriding the tender procedures in Lead in Fighter Trainer (LIFT), deciding on light utility helicopters before key documents have been finalised and allowing the initialling of the submarine contracts before the affordability study had been completed? p) Did the Joint Investigation Team study the contracts and investigate them? Have they established beyond any doubt that all transactions were in order? q) The Report has uncovered numerous deviations from procedures. Have they investigated the impact of these errors and failures on the legality of purchases? r) A number of allegations have been made about the role and influence of Mr Joe Modise in the Strategic Defence Packages. Had it been established whether he acted with the knowledge of his Cabinet colleagues. s) The Auditor-General pointed out in his “Special Review” report that the technical evaluation of the LIFT represented a material deviation from the originally adopted value system? A special Ministerial briefing decided that a non-costed option should be recommended as the preferred option. Has it been determined whether anyone received a kickback from this change in the deal for the fighter trainer aircraft? Allegations in this regard go to the heart of the question of possible corruption hanging over the Strategic Defence Packages! t) Who kept the minutes of the Minister’s Committee meetings? Was it the Chief of Acquisitions? u) Regarding the light utility helicopter programme, it was found that the implementation costs of R176 million were not included in the total programme cost submitted to Cabinet in September 1999. This amount had to be incorporated in the normal SAAF operating budget. Has it been established who was responsible for this expensive oversight? Has action been taken against any individual? v) The Report highlight serious errors and mistakes regarding the Industrial Participation process with reference to the purchase of submarines. Of special importance were the roles of senior government officials. What action has been taken against those officials? How did their actions and decisions influence the selection of the preferred bidder? On what grounds, given the contents of the report in this regard, were government exonerated of any wrongdoing? w) Did the investigators come across instances where government had insisted to primary contractors that certain sub-contractors had to made use of? If so, was any evidence of conflicts of interest uncovered? What criteria were used for black empowerment companies chosen as sub-contractors, and specifically, were tenders issued for all black empowerment companies to apply? Was any investigation conducted to determine whether money accruing to sub-contractors have flowed back to politicians and officials in government or the ruling party, considering the public utterances of Schabir Shaik indicating donations from his company went into ANC coffers. x) How could it be allowed that a former member of Cabinet (Mr Joe Modise) initialled a contract for submarines at a cost of R4.5 billion, before an affordability study had been undertaken? y) Did the Joint Investigation Team investigate the most likely success/failure of the promised Coega stainless steel plant, as part of the industrial participation offer for the submarine deal? z) Regarding the corvettes, the Report states that due to non-conformance to critical criteria, as well as deviation from the value system, it had a far-reaching impact on the eventual selection of the preferred bidder for the corvettes. What was the consequence on the final outcome and does it provide sufficient ground for cancelling this main contract? aa) There is a difference of R916 million between the costs presented to Cabinet on 18 November 1998 (R6001 million) and the costs contracted for (R6917 million) for the corvettes. Who is to blame for this deviation/error? bb) Regarding the state of the Strategic Defence Packages, who is to be blamed and held accountable for the cabinet approval of R30 billion on 1 December 1999, and an estimated total cost in excess of R66bn, two years later? Where does the buck stop? Who decided not to include financing costs in the total price over the future period? Why were there warnings in the “affordability report” ignored? This report clearly emphasized certain risks, i.e. foreign exchange movements, non-materialisation of industrial participation benefits, and the impact of interest obligations. Despite these warnings, the cabinet decided in December 1999 to go ahead with the Arms Deal. A media briefing at that time gave no suggestion that the real cost of the transactions was well in excess of R30.3 billion or that the deal was subject to any risks. cc) Did the Joint Investigation Team do any forensic audits on bank accounts of any individuals or organisations, and if not, why not? dd) When (date) did Parliament approve the Strategic Defence Packages, and at what cost? Was this R30.3 billion procurement in line with the spirit and letter of the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review? ee) What happened to the promise by Government to create 65 000 jobs and that Industrial Participation projects would amount to R104 billion in investment, due to the Strategic Defence Packages? Many allegations pertain to contracts awarded to subcontractors. These allegations did not fall within the scope of the “Special Review by the Auditor-General” and the Joint Investigation Report has only few pages devoted to it. Will there be further investigations into these allegations? Will the complaints of competitors against the process that was followed for the selection of subcontractors be investigated? ff) Persons involved in the overall acquisition process received various gifts (including luxury vehicles) Excluding Mr Tony Yengeni and Mr Woerffel who were arrested and prosecuted, have any other public representatives, official, public servant etc. been investigated, and if not, will they be investigated? And if so, by whom? gg) The Joint Investigation Report indicated that Mr Chippy Shaik did not recuse himself from the important Project Control Board (PCB) meetings, but continued to take part in the process that led to the ultimate awarding of contract to companies. He also signed the minutes. Has it been established what effect these actions could have had on the awarding of contracts? hh) Why didn’t the Joint Investigation Team investigate the authority of the Joint Project Team any further? The Joint Project Team allegedly played a significant part in the award of contract to subcontractors regarding the combat suite for the corvettes. Of particular concern are: i) No minutes were kept of meetings and decisions. ii) No tender procedures were applied. iii) No records were kept of the process. iv) Unfairness was at the order of the day regarding the handling of certain proposals. v) No proper risk evaluation was done. vi) Conflicting statements by senior government officials. vii) Withholding of important information (i.e. Detexis is a Thomson company) viii) The manner in which a risk premium was calculated. ix) Was a proper risk assessment made? ii) Taken into account all the outstanding allegations, how will eventual finding of criminal conduct influence the main contracts entered into? Have these contracts been scrutinised by the Joint Investigation Team? jj) Why were the main contract not fully investigated and what are the chances that the validity of these contract my by impacted by the findings of criminal misconducts? kk) Mr Shaik (Chippy) did not recuse himself from no less than 8 out of 11 Project Control Board meetings (PCB) regarding the conflict of interest he had with the supply of the combat suite to the corvettes. Where he did recuse himself, he remained present in the meetings. Did the Joint Investigation Team not find enough evidence in this case to declare the awarding of this subcontract null and void? ll) ADS became part of GFC (preferred bidder and main contractor for the corvettes), ADS was also the Combat Suite contractor for the corvettes, ADS was also a contender for sub-contracts: this is contradictory to any good procurement practice. Hasn’t this event cast sufficient shadow over the awarding of the contracts (main- and subcontractors) for the corvettes? How has these events influenced the validity of the awarded contracts? mm) How could the alleged meeting of 19 August 1999 (with no records) decided to award a major subcontract, especially where evidence of this meeting is contradicted by other witnesses? nn) What powers did the Joint Investigation Team have at their disposal to obtain access to all personnel and records, before and after the date of 03 December 1999, in order to make a proper evaluation of DIP and NIP contracts? How can the Report express a view on DIP and NIP contracts if they have not studied their contents, performance guarantees, and likely changes to succeed? oo) The Joint Investigation Team has successfully identified numerous gaps, failures and procedural wrong-doings in the Report yet, regarding the scrutiny of the main contracts, they have devoted less than five paragraphs (1 page) to the main contracts. Is there a possibility that any of their findings in the Report may have impacted on the validity of any of the main contracts, and any o f the subcontracts? pp) Did the Joint Investigation found any evidence of gaps that existed between actions taken/orders received by government official and public representatives. Were gaps identified between what official presented to politicians and what politicians told official to do, find and say? Role of European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) The Joint Investigations Agencies have been significantly reticent in their probe and resulting report on the aspects of the role of EADS , a beneficiary of the Arms Deal, which raised a number of questions about the integrity of some public officials. EADS, a subsidiary of Mercedes Benz, doled out gifts of motor vehicles at ridiculously low prices to key public officials and other national figures. The revelations of these gifts clearly showed that no purchase contracts existed in respect of some of the vehicles given to these public figures. However, when the shady deals were exposed, hasty hire purchase arrangements were made to cover-up the shady deals. For instance, it was revealed that President Mbeki had been given a luxury S600 bullet proof Mercedes Benz for test-driving for a period of six months. Tony Yengeni test-drove his for seven months. Mbeki’s car was only returned to Daimler Chrysler when the media exposed in March 2001 Tony Yengeni’s deal. All enquiries by the media about detail of the transaction hit a solid wall of reticence. Daimler Chrysler’s spokesperson Ms Chakela said that she could not talk. “I cannot comment due to Daimler Chrysler’s policy of providing no comment to the press until the investigation into the Arms Deal has been concluded.”. President Mbeki’s acquisition was valued at R2 million. It is not clear what the details of the test-drive were and the secrecy with which it was handled is cause for concern. It also raises questions why the test-driving took so long and why it was terminated and the car returned after enquiries made by the media. The media, in the following transactions, exposed both Daimler Chrysler and EADS: a) Tony Yengeni only made financing arrangements after media enquiries of his 4x4 Mercedes Benz acquisition and several months down the line. b) Nafcoc officials were also given expensive vehicles by Daimler Chrysler and had to return them when the media exposed these transactions. c) SANDF Commander General Siphiwe Nyanda was also given two Mercedes Benz at a sizeable discount. d) General Roelof Beukes, former Chief of the Airforce, was also given an expensive Mercedes Benz on similar generous terms. e) Vanan Pillay of the Department of Trade and Industry was also a beneficiary in this bonanza. He was part of the negotiating team in the Arms acquisition exercise. If not for the intervention by the senior German management who suspended their EADS Managing Director, Michael Woerffel, after exposures of this corruption our government would not have conceded the need for the investigation, which they are now so eager to sweep under the carpet. It has now become a pattern for would-be suppliers of goods to short-circuit transactions by directly approaching political heads, who in turn manage and steer the transactions to a pre-determined conclusion, disregarding legal tender processes. Corruption has seeped deep into the public sector, tarnishes governance and erodes the moral fibre of our entire society. Civil society must take up the cudgels against this scourge and rescue our nation from the moral decay into which it has sunk. Role of President Thabo Mbeki In view of the adverse economic climate such as the drastically escalated cost of the Arms Deal, the risks involved related to the non-defence industrial participation which may not materialise, the uncontrollable depreciation of our rand against major currencies of our trading partners, UDM urgently and strongly recommends that government cancel the second and third legs of the deal. People need jobs, adequate health care and education, not arms. President Thabo Mbeki stands out like a sore thumb as the major architect of the whole Arms Deal fiasco. He has taken pains to present himself nationally and internationally as the champion of the cause of fighting poverty at home and in Africa. He has spear-headed the Africa recovery initiative, now encapsulated in New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Yet his actions are an antithesis of his much-publicised initiative. The wild idea of an arms procurement of these dimensions, his high-jacking of the tendering process, the emasculation and marginalisation of SCOPA, and Parliament and compromising the exalted office of the Auditor-General all conspire to project him as the unmistakable driving force behind this Arms Deal debacle. In hindsight, it is not surprising that he came out guns blazing in defence of the deal at an earlier press conference after the media revelations of corruption in the Arms Deal. His damage-control endeavour however has not succeeded in putting the matter to rest. The joint investigation by the Agencies has omitted to probe the Cabinet sub-committee over which the President presides. Instead they hastened to absolve them from wrongdoing without interrogating the facts which are continually surfacing. His record in addressing the socio-economic problems leaves much to be desired. His dabbling in the scientific discourse about HIV/AIDS, is tantamount to venturing where eagles dare, and has cast a dark shadow on government commitment and capacity to drive the anti AIDS campaign. The UDM acknowledges the call by former President Nelson Mandela for political leaders to be at the forefront of the fight against HIV/AIDS. The leadership of the UDM accepts this responsibility without hesitation. The overwhelming majority of the civic, religious and political leaders and organisations in this country are similarly committed. It is only President Mbeki, and his increasingly dazed and confused National Executive Committee (NEC) sycophants, who play with words and rather waste money to defend the indefensible in court. They are two-faced, considering the fact that they claim a lack of funds prevent them from distributing affordable lifesaving treatment, but they have money for court cases. They are hypocrites because they claimed victory earlier this year against the pharmaceutical companies, but now that they are free to use their victory they have new excuses. They are deceitful because they argue lack of resources whilst they simultaneously go on a R66 billion shopping spree for unnecessary weapons. But perhaps the greatest deceit is that committed by the leader of a country, who would not admit his undeniable errors publicly, but rather gets his party lapdogs (NEC) to issue a watered-down statement in response to justifiable criticism that comes from within where it cannot be denounced or ignored out of hand. His administration has created a crisis of confidence in education, job creation, and poverty alleviation. The time has come for the ANC to call on him to recuse himself from public office. He is driving this country to the edge of a precipice. He is not fit to govern. Conclusion The report has been held up by the government as a complete and definitive exoneration of the Arms Deal, one that absolves them of wrongdoing. We disagree. One simply has to look at the context in which this report finally came to Parliament. The truth is that the public lost confidence in the process when Mbeki rejected calls for a Judicial Commission of Inquiry and stopped the Heath SIU from participating in the investigation. The subsequent interference by the executive, the unwarranted attacks on Parliament, the ANC’s pig-headed behaviour in the public accounts committee, and finally the Speaker’s involvement, all conspired to turn this investigation into a farce of monumental proportions. One year after the Government launched the investigation, the investigators still refuse to state what their Terms of Reference were. The UDM is astounded that despite this interference and manipulation the government has the temerity to celebrate its innocence and label anyone who disagrees a racist. The truth is the report finds senior government officials guilty of despicable behaviour, but somehow we are asked to believe the politicians did not know and are not culpable. This is nonsense! When qualified officials’ advices are ignored and the Cabinet instead approves a vastly more expensive deal, the report finds that the politicians did not do anything wrong. It is attributed to Cabinet “prerogative”, which explain nothing. But when corruption occurs it is attributed to the officials. And as the politicians make the officials their fall guys for gross mismanagement, we are still expected to believe that the integrity of the deal is intact, despite ample proof that at the very least the politicians didn’t exercise proper control over the process. The ANC has taken this country to the edge of the abyss. All that stands between South Africa and the cesspool of corruption is a handful of dedicated opposition parties and the media. It is time for Mbeki and his cronies to realise that “struggle credentials” and skin colour do not automatically make them immune to mismanagement and corruption. Nothing has served to illustrate this sad fact more acutely than this botched investigation – and Mbeki’s stubborn and misguided views on HIV/Aids. The original budget for the Arms Deal took into account the socio-economic demands of our society, hence the Defence Review’s conservative figure. These social considerations have been echoed by Mbeki in his discourse on the HIV/Aids pandemic. How do we explain this surreptitious escalation of the Arms Deal budget to R66 billion when these socio-economic conditions have not changed? UDM recommends that Parliament and SCOPA should regard the findings of the investigation by the Agencies as an Interim Report, which indicates areas of further in-depth investigation by an Independent Judicial Commission of Inquiry. That commission should unearth the rot at the centre of this Arms Procurement Deal, and propose recommendations that will lead this country out of the depths of corruption, which underpin the flourishing culture of depravity and moral decay that confronts our society. The Comrades in Corruption can rest assured that this matter will not be allowed to be swept under the carpet. They can no longer shield themselves behind the hackneyed baseless charges of racism to people who expose their misdemeanours. The concerns of the Arms Deal controversy are not sectarian or racial. They are embraced by all South Africans irrespective of race or creed. The time has come for the Cabinet to take the public in its confidence by accessing it to their threat analysis, which motivated their decision on expenditure on Arms. If they fail to do so, they leave us with the conviction that this procurement was designed to line their pockets and fund their party. In light of Mbeki government’s behaviour, one wonders what prompted Mr Nelson Mandela to lament that little did he know that the corruption, which had characterised the apartheid regime, was now endemic among his ruling comrades. The old adage that “The troughs have changed however the pigs have remained the same” is appropriate to describe this situation. Sources a) Joint Investigation Report b) SCOPA’s 14th Report c) Defence Review and White Paper on Defence d) The Mail and Guardian e) The Sunday Times f) Noseweek g) Financial Mail h) Zapiro i) Centre for Conflict Resolution
Admin
26 Apr, 1998
UDM on opposition alliances
Statement by Co-leaders of the UDM With possible alliance pacts between the opposition parties strongly back on the political agenda, certain basic principles regarding alliances need to be revisited. The mere forming of an alliance between the opposition parties (DP/NP, NP/IFP, DP/IFP or DP/NP/IFP) will not change the political landscape of the country. Such an alliance, whether it is a “loose alliance” (each party with its own structure and lists) or a more “formal alliance” (one manifesto and candidate list), it will not attract one single vote from the ANC constituency. All that it would mean is that one will pool all the current votes of opposition parties. That will not erode the power base of the ANC. The UDM indicated even before its launch that it believes that South Africans are looking for something new, that all the current political parties as they are represented in parliament reflects in one way or the other apartheid. The UDM in working on grassroots level experience a need by South Africans to break loose from the current racial divides of South African politics. South Africans are looking towards the future, they need a vision, and they want to build this country. What is even more evident is the fact that they want to do this together, as one nation. A recent Markinor survey indicated that the UDM is growing and that it is growing at the expense of the ANC majority. The UDM truly reflects the South African nation, 72% black, 16% white, 8% coloured and 4% Indian. Analysts indicated that they believe the only real threat to the ANC is the UDM. The UDM will gain nothing by getting into bed with any of the current opposition political parties. The UDM, in national interest, would however invite opposition parties who are serious about the realignment of South African politics to disband themselves. This should take place at an opposition party convention where new leadership should be elected for the new formation. This should be done with all parties taking on an equal role and placing national interest first and personal or party agendas should not determine the agenda of such a convention. The UDM, though the fastest growing party in the country, in the interest of the real realignment of South African politics, would be willing to be part of such an exercise. The UDM remains firm in its belief that that would be the only, lasting way to truly redefine South African politics.
Admin
26 Jan, 1998
Opposisie politiek: onwelkom of verkeerd aangebied?
verklaring deur Media en Bemarkings Direkteur Tim du Plessis raak in sy artikel “Opposisie is uit” reeds in die eerste paragraaf ook aan die ooglopende antwoord. Die UDM glo dat net so min as wat die “redding en heil” vir Suid Afrika in die “klasieke liberale demokrasie” lê, net so min is die rol van opposisiepartye en opposisie – politiek in die klassieke liberale rol van opposisiepartye gesetel. Die vraag is nie watter groeperinge in die land vir- sterk opposisie en watter daarteen is nie, maar veel eerder die herdefiniëring van opposisiepartye se rol in die Suid Afrikaanse politiek. Alle onafhanklike meningsopnames sedert die begin van 1997 het getoon dat die ANC as meerderheidsparty steun verloor. Dit het verder aangedui dat geen van die bestaande parlementêre politieke partye by hierdie verlies van steun baat nie. Die stemme swerf dus nog rond. Hierin lê daar twee boodskappe : Ondersteuners van die ANC is wel bereid om hul affiliasie met die ANC te beëindig, en geen van die huidige parlementêre partye bied ‘n alternatief vir hierdie swewende stem nie. Wanneer die DP en die NP mekaar dus die stryd aansê oor wie nou werklik die effektiefste (lees luidrugtigste) opposisieparty is, verander dit weining aan die werklike politieke prentjie nie. Ja, die DP mag dalk in die proses ‘n paar stemme van die NP wegneem maar die meerderheid kiesers van die land sien steeds nie vir hulself ‘n sielkundige tuiste by enige een van die twee partye nie. Hoe dan ook anders as opposisiepartye hulself as effektief beskou wanneer hulle Nelson Mandela beledig, stem teen wetgewing wat die lewenskwaliteit van die meerderheid van Suid Afrikaners verbeter, en al hul parlementêre aksies daarop dui dat hulle hul huidige (wit) magsbasis probeer konsolideer. Die UDM, anders as die NP en die DP, het nie nodig om te probeer swart steun trek om as geloofwaardig beskou te word nie. Die meerderheid van die UDM steun is swart, mense wat reeds weg van die ANC vir hulself ‘n politieke tuiste by die UDM gevind het. Die UDM bied aan alle Suid Afrikaners wat wil deel wees van vooruitgang, wat konstruktief wil help bou aan die nuwe Suid Afrika, so ‘n politieke tuiste. Die UDM sien sy rol na die 1999 – verkiesing verder ook, nie as die van opposisie nie, maar as deel van die regering. Daar is sekere uitdagings wat die land nou in die gesig staar, uitdagings wat suksesvol opgelos moet word in die breër belang van Suid Afrika en sy mense. Landsbelang moet nou bo kleinlike, party – politieke belang gestel word. Dit is hoe die UDM ook sy politiek in die komende jaar en as deel van regering na 1999 sal bedryf. Dit beteken nie dat ons nie krities sal wees wanneer nodig nie, maar dat kritiek so gelewer sal word dat die finale besluit steeds positief beïnvloed kan word. Waar die regering in landsbelang programme implementeer, sal die UDM hul steun en samewerking in die verband gee. Sou die regering egter in partybelang eerder as landsbelang optree, sal die UDM deur sy deelname dit uitwys en alternatiewe verskaf. Die feit dat die NP uit die Regering van Nasionale Eenheid onttrek het, beteken nie dat opposisiepartye nie ‘n konstruktiewe rol het om te speel nie. Dit dui slegs op ‘n onvermoë van die NP se kant om die rol te kon vervul. Die uitdaging vir opposisiepartye is dus nie om net te skree en raas nie. Dit is veel eerder om die regering in die opstel van sy nasionale prioriteite te beïnvloed en toe te sien dat die ooreengekome prioriteite die nodige aandag ontvang. Indien opposisiepartye nie instaat is om dit te doen nie, dan is die skrif werklik aan die muur en kan die kieser tereg vra oor wat die doel en nut daarvan is om te stem. Wanneer hy stem verkies die landsburger nie net partye as opposisiepartye nie, maar kies hy hulle ook as deel van die regering. Suid Afrikaanse politieke partye loop die risiko dat die kieser hom kan agterlaat. Die grootste uitdaging in 1999 mag dalk juis wees om die kieser by die stembus te kry – dit moet verhoed word. Dieselfde geld vir die rol van die media. Terwyl ons in ‘n stadium in ons land se geskiedenis is waar dit gaan oor die vestiging en ontwikkeling van die demokrasie behoort die media ook deel van die opleidingsproses te wees. Die boodskap moet ook van die media kom in die daarstelling en bepaling van prioriteite. Die media het ook ‘n rol om te prys waar nodig en te kritiseer waar gefaal word. Die media, in die beskerming en ontwikkeling van ons brose demokrasie, het ook nodig om die alternatief vir die kieser te stel: alternatiewe menings, standpunte en alternatiewe oplossings. Alles gedoen op ‘n regverdige, objektiewe wyse, ten doel om ‘n ingeligte kieser daar te stel. Sou dit die benadering van almal betrokke wees dan sien ek nie dieselfde donker prentjie as wat Tim skets nie. In die UDM glo ons, dat ons saam die oplossings kan vind – gesetel in Suid Afrika se ryk verskeidenheid.
Admin
06 Jan, 1998
Matric Results 1997
With the matric results of 1997 now available, including indications that the Gauteng results are also 5% down from last year, a gloomy picture of our school system emerges. The simple truth is that without an adequate educational system, all our other national efforts to curb joblessness, poverty and crime, and become a nation of hope and a world player in the new millennium, will come to nothing. Adequate education now, more than ever, needs to become an urgent national priority. The following should be noted: A culture of learning, teaching and discipline needs to be cultivated in our schools as a matter of utmost urgency. Without this prerequisite, the ‘outcomes-based’ policy of Curriculum 2000, with its much less emphasis on regular examining, will be a humiliating disaster, leading to even worse matric results. This culture of learning, teaching and discipline will have to eradicate the disastrous consequences of the upheavals in black education in the 1980’s with the ‘liberation before education’ rallying cry. It also needs to address the problems of bad school management and unmotivated or ill-trained teachers, and really involve parents as a crucial component of a well-run educational system. By empowering principals, teachers and school governing bodies and moving away from an over-centralised and interventionist system, the foundations for a successful system would have been laid. This need for a culture of learning, teaching and discipline is essentially part of the need for a moral regeneration of the very fibre of our society. It is not acceptable for teachers to turn up late for school or not at all, to allow strikes and protests to take priority over proper teaching, or to order handbooks late or not at all. Pupils should also attend school and take responsibility for their education, whilst parents and the community need to take co-responsibility, creating the best possible environment for educating their children. Unsettling government policies regarding the appointment of teachers should be reviewed in total. The whole retrenchment scheme has wrecked havoc with the morale of teachers and has drained schools of some of the best and brightest teachers. In some instances, it has led to irreparable damage. Balancing the restraints of the budget with the provision of the best possible education – including teaching staff – needs a more creative approach that the hamhanded and haphazard efforts at present. A careful and thorough analysis of the whole education system needs to be made in order to satisfy the demands for a system offering the best possible value for money. If, however, this has indicated a too thinly spread budget, the Government should ask itself if the country could afford not to spend the shortfall. The UDM supports calls for an urgent national summit involving all educational stakeholders. The agenda should include the above-mentioned points and be aimed at resolving problems and finding solutions, not distributing blame. The 1997 matric results are timely alarm bells that Government dares not ignore. The country now waits for Government to react creatively, decisively and promptly. If that is the sole legacy of the ‘class of 1997’, their results would at least have served a purpose; for those who did well, we wish to convey our congratulations.
Admin
15 Dec, 1997
South African political landscape
Joint media statement about South African political landscape by Roelf Meyer and Bantu Holomisa of the UDM and Tony Leon of the Democratic Party The leaders of the DP and the UDM held a meeting during the past week in which an overview of the present political situation in the country was undertaken. Both parties confirmed their viewpoints that an over-dominant one party state was detrimental to the interests of South Africa and the need exists for vibrant opposition. Both agreed on the further need for a restructuring of the political scene in South Africa. Developments during 1997 have been a positive start in this regard but the process is far from complete. Any restructuring needs to be based on breaking the existing racial mould in which our politics is cast and on the establishment of political values based on shared principles. The principles in the Constitution requiring national unity, the development of multi-party democracy and serving of the national interest are key indicators in this regard, but any political movement also requires a shared economic, political and social vision. With this in mind, the UDM and the DP will in the new year focus on how these principles can be advanced by the two parties. For this purpose the Joint Committee established earlier between the two parties will be re-activated early in the new year. A meeting is planned where the state of the nation will be evaluated and further planning is undertaken.
Admin
10 Dec, 1997
The challenges facing South Africa as we approach the New Millennium
Presented by Mr Bantu Holomisa, UDM Co-leader, at the South African Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg In the letter of invitation which I received from the Institute of Race Relations, it is stated that the United Democratic Movement (UDM) is attracting much media attention. The UDM on the other hand feels that scant attention is paid to its activities by the media, so it is a matter of debate as to whether we enjoy any sufficient media coverage or not. However, what is important to us is the reasons of our existence or the process which led to the formation of the UDM. The process which led to the first 1994 April democratic elections in the history of South Africa was initiated to bring about freedom to the people of South Africa. Indeed the first democratic government was unveiled to assume its task of continuing with the democratisation process of state institutions, above all to bring about qualitative change and particularly improving the lives of the poor. The UDM is ready to measure to current and future challenges facing South Africa, as we approach the 21 Century. We embrace the challenge with passion and alacrity the practical demands of rebuilding our severely divided society with unprecedented vigour. We will set free the creative power inherent in our diversity, and will co-operate with all stake-holders to ensure a quality of life and freedom for every citizen, based on good governance and civil order, towards being a winning nation. The UDM presently is for obvious reasons not represented at parliament. This does not necessarily mean that our primarily aim is to contest the 1999 elections and be part and parcel of other political parties in parliament without any broader vision and sense of purpose. We clearly see ourselves playing an effective role outside and inside parliament if ever we gets sufficient seats in 1999 elections. The UDM programme of action is geared towards the achievement of just social outcome. In dealing with: unemployment; civil order; housing; education; economy; We are currently involved in the process of designing specific policy positions, what the UDM have contrary to what is said, is broader policy framework or principles. Can the current political parties stand to the current and future challenges? The parliamentary experience/or observations such as: the inability of minority parties to exert pressure and hold the executive to account; the majority party using its numeric strength to dismiss constructive views from other parties; the past activities of parties in parliament being used by the majority party to weaken its opposition during policy-making process with some of the issues with no direct connection on what is being deliberated upon; These are some of the factors, which had weakened the current political parties in terms of playing effective opposition role. It is against this background that the UDM has a role to play and to fill this gap and unite the country by consolidating and defending this hard won fledgling democracy as we move towards the 21 Century and positioning ourselves in dealing with the unforeseen challenges of the future and building together a just society for all. The role of civil society in addressing these challenges should not be undermined. The non-government sector in South Africa has played an important role in making sure that Apartheid as government policy fails. This sector has played an important role in capacitating our communities through various means, in the form of training, poverty reduction programmes, particularly in the rural areas, providing support for small and medium enterprises for the disadvantaged sector of our communities, adult basic education to combat illiteracy. The South African Institute of Race Relations with other similar minded NGOs has in the past and I believe still made education a priority by recognising its importance as a liberating tool. The fact that these institutions granted scholarships and bursaries to the needy bears testimony to this commitment of uplifting our communities. It clear that the government alone cannot transform our society without the active involvement of the Non-governmental Institutions. The fact that NGOs by their nature are suppose to be apolitical they are strategically placed to intervene on behalf of citizens, especially when the government is inclined to abuse its political power in pursuance of sectional/ or individual interests. The civil society can effectively play its role by supplementing oppositional parties in government. This can be achieved by being public watchdogs or whistle blowers, especially when acts of corruption are detected. However, we do acknowledge the limitations which the NGOs are faced with in carrying out their mandate, precisely that the funding environment had dried up. The future direction of South Africa is already mapped by the ANC through RDP initially which was later abandoned and replaced by GEAR as government normative policy document, it sets out in no uncertain terms as to what the ANC hopes to achieve in a given period from job creation to provision of infrastructure. Today teachers who are supposed to be building the nation are to be retrenched. So compare the objectives of GEAR with what is happening now. Is it more jobs or speedy retrenchments of the people whom should be benefiting from the new dispensation? Judge for yourselves… In conclusion I wish to take this opportunity to thank the Institute of Race Relations for inviting me and the audience. Bantu Holomisa UDM Co-leader
Admin
01 Dec, 1997
Jobs summit: acclaim for breakthrough
Statement by Bantu Holomisa and Roelf Meyer The UDM is extremely grateful for the agreement reached at Nedlac on the presidential jobs summit planned for the second quarter of 1998. We have taken note of the two phased approach towards the summit and the follow-up phase envisaged. Although proper planning is essential, it is a pity that this most desperate need of so many of our fellow South Africans took so long to receive the proper attention it deserves. It is, however, clear that sufficient new jobs are not going to be created by government and big business alone. The only way to achieve sustainable success in this area, the UDM believes, will be to start with relevant programmes at grass roots level, targeting individuals and households. We need to bring jobs to the townships. In the quest for urgent and creative solutions to this priority issue, the UDM will hold an economic workshop early in the new year. This workshop will involve experts in the respective fields of economic planning, labour and related issues. The UDM will therefore be in a position to creatively take part in the consultation and negotiation phase towards the proposed presidential summit. If the war against unemployment is not won, a sea of desperation and hopelessness will obliterate many of the good things that South Africa has achieved so far. Unemployment needs to be an urgent national priority.
Admin
24 Nov, 1997
Futile summit by opposition parties
Statement issued by Roelf Meyer Over the recent past, the idea of closer co-operation between opposition parties in our country, has been mooted a couple of times. This idea has to be exposed for the futile exercise in hopelessness it essentially is now that the NP has announced plans to hold such a summit early next year. These ‘plans’ are essentially similar to proposals the DP has made earlier and can be interpreted either as a concerted effort by the two parties to get such a summit off the ground, or a hijacking by the NP of a DP initiative. Fact is that efforts on these lines will be futile if the crucial issue, namely a restructuring of our politics, is not addressed. The bigger picture is that South African parliamentary politics is presently being conducted along racial lines, with the essentially ‘white’ parties in no position to threaten the majority, essentially ‘black’ party, notwithstanding attempts by the ‘white’ parties to rearrange themselves. These efforts will rather increase the racial polarisation by being interpreted as a ganging up against the ANC, even if attempts to draw in the IFP, which is regarded as a Zulu traditional niche party, is successful. These attempts will be futile in changing the present numbers game in our politics. Without successfully increasing their support bases, the combined support of the parliamentary opposition parties will not even reach 25% according to recent polling figures. This is an even more emasculated opposition than at present. The only viable answer is to restructure the politics out of the present racial rut and present South Africans from all communities with political parties that appeal on grounds of their values, visions and policies rather than the racial ticket. This means that parties need to shed the image and baggage that presently prevent members from other communities to vote for them. The NP and DP, for example, will never in their present forms be able to attract meaningful black support. This is the political reality around which the NP and DP are conducting their futile egg-dances. Without making this paradigm shift, they are destined to become withering niche parties with nothing more than curiosity value. The parties will therefore have to reinvent themselves. The NP cannot expect black support for itself as a party or its idea of an opposition summit while clamouring for consolidation of its (essentially white) support base. The UDM was born as a result of the determination to present to South Africans a party free from historical baggage, with sound core values and well-grounded policy positions suited to the needs of the real South Africa. It has already proved itself by attracting support from literary all communities in the country. It is at present the only party able to draw substantial support in ANC strongholds, as illustrated by rallies in the Eastern Cape, where 20 000 supporters attended, the North West Province, Mpumalanga and the Northern Province. While the DP and NP are busy rearranging the deckchairs on their political Titanic, the UDM is building a substantial party on its vision of a party for all South Africans, aiming at making South Africa a winning nation to the benefit of all her people.
Admin
23 Nov, 1997
Meyer and Holomisa hold rally in KwaMhlanga
Statement by UDM Media Manager The quiet of the late Sunday morning in Kwaggafontein near KwaMhlanga (Mpumalanga) was shattered today by the beating of drums, rhythmic singing and ululating women when Bantu Holomisa and Roelf Meyer visited the rural highveld area of Mpumalanga for a rally in the local stadium. 700 supporters from the area, many of the women in the colourful Ndebele traditional dress and men sporting UDM T-shirts, enthusiastically cheered the two UDM leaders in a program of song and dance. In the leaders’ addresses, Holomisa emphasised the crime question, referring to President Mandela’s acknowledgement that MK fighters may be involved in the killing of Free State farmers. Holomisa said that only half of the original number of MK soldiers had been integrated in the SANDF. Many of those have since left the Force, complaining of integration irregularities. What happened to all the ex-fighters? If they weren’t integrated in the SANDF, were they at least integrated in society? Holomisa demanded a proper government investigation into the issue of the armed forces of the liberation movements. Regarding the Truth Commission, Holomisa emphasised the UDM’s viewpoint that all people who can shed relevant light on our past should be encouraged to do so before the TRC, including people such as Ms Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and Mr PW Botha. A lot of allegations have been made against Madikizela-Mandela recently, but why have the allegations not been investigated earlier and the culprits exposed? Regarding the position of tribal chiefs, Holomisa said that a policy commission on tribal authorities of the UDM has been tasked with coming up with a workable solution to the issue. Roelf Meyer said that the UDM is growing to be the only party able to challenge the ANC, whilst the ANC is increasingly becoming more like the old NP regime in the way it is consolidating power and not giving attention to the real needs of the people on the ground. Possibly the greatest challenge now is that of job creation. There has been no growth in the number of jobs offered over the last years, which is so disconcerting that the UDM is planning an economic workshop focussing on the issue. It will be held in the new year and involve all interested parties. Meyer also emphasised that other issues will be dealt with in the same way, showing that the UDM is not all talk, but means business. In the quest for the hearts and minds of all South Africans, the UDM will try to outvote other parties in stressing that the apartheid struggle is over, but that the new struggle is for the future of South Africa. About 40 chiefs and Inkozi also attended the rally from areas as far as Piet Retief and Secunda. The chairman of the meeting was local UDM leader Prince James Mhlangu.
