Dr Mkhacani Maswanganyi, MP Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Finance PO Box 15 Cape Town 8000 Dear Dr Maswanganyi R3.5 trillion at risk: the Public Investment Corporation’s appearance at the Standing Committee on Finance – further issues and pertinent questions that need to be asked of the PIC 1. Further to my correspondence dated 10 November 2025 , in which you were copied, I understand that the Standing Committee on Finance (SCOF) is scheduled to receive a report from the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) on 5 December 2025. 2. In regard, I wish to refer SCOF to my correspondence to the President of the Republic of South Africa, Mr MC Ramaphosa and the Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), Mr Songezo Zibi, MP, which I attach for your ease of refence: 2.1. On 29 October 2025 regarding: “R3.5 trillion at risk: the Public Investment Corporation’s governance collapse demands action ” and 2.2. on 8 November 2025 regarding: “Renewed concerns over probable governance irregularities and conflicts of interest at the Public Investment Corporation: the PIC’s confused(ing) rhetoric regarding the Lanseria and FlySafair deals” . 3. I understand from the SCOPA Chairperson Zibi, that he has referred the entire matter concerning the PIC, as submitted by the UDM, to SCOF for further consideration, as SCOPA is currently engaged in the Road Accident Fund inquiry and both committees share several members. 4. In addition to the above, there have been further developments which I wish to bring to SCOF’s attention, and I refer the Committee to the following documents attached for ease of reference: 4.1. A 30 October 2025 correspondence from Mabotja Attorneys on behalf of Acapulco Trade & Invest 164 (Pty) Ltd, dated 30 October 2025, regarding “FORMAL CLARIFICATION & REPRESENTATION IN RESPECT OF THE LANSERIA HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD TRANSACTION.” as well as a 4.2. 7 October 2025 correspondence from Mabotja Attorneys to Werksmans Attorneys, acting on behalf of the PIC, regarding: “LANSERIA AND RELATED MATTERS”, 5. For additional context to the bigger scheme of things, I refer to an article published in the Business Day of 5 November 2025 entitled” “PIC furious over R400m payout to Lanseria BEE partner” 6. Given the context outlined in all the UDM’s correspondence and the article referenced above, it is evident that SCOF will need to conduct a thorough and far-reaching investigation into the broader operations of the PIC, particularly its dealings involving PAIDF I and II and the investment of Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF) funds. The arbitration award in favour of Acapulco, dated 17 September 2025 and amounting to R411 282 264.44, has clearly unsettled matters and exposed deeper issues within the PIC’s governance and investment practices. 7. Further to points 5 and 6 in my letter of 29 October 2025 concerning the Lanseria Airport Holdings and FlySafair matters, the UDM recommends that SCOF pose the following questions to PIC: 7.1. Management fees 7.1.1. Would you state, for the record, the total management fees Harith has drawn from PAIDF I, PAIDF II, and the newly constituted Harith Infraco? 7.1.2. Can you provide a detailed breakdown of those fees by fund, year, and category? 7.2. Fund performance 7.2.1. Provide a comprehensive summary of the financial and operational performance of PAIDF I and PAIDF II. 7.2.2. What were the key value drivers, impairments, exits, and realised or unrealised returns associated with each fund? 7.3. Value created for pensioners 7.3.1. Based on your own reporting and audited figures, how much net value, after all fees, costs, and adjustments i.e. have these funds generated for South African pensioners? 7.3.2. Are you able to confirm whether the net contribution has been positive, neutral, or negative? 7.4. Restructuring and recapitalisation 7.4.1. Harith has recently undertaken what appears to be restructuring, recapitalisation, and redesign of its funds. 7.4.2. Would you explain the commercial rationale for each of these steps? 7.4.3. What direct impact did these actions have on the value of the underlying investments and, specifically, on the stake ultimately attributable to the GEPF? 7.5. Harith Infraco participation 7.5.1. In the newly established Harith Infraco, what is the direct interest, shareholding percentage, or participation in returns attributable to the GEPF? 7.5.2. Has this position changed in any way compared to the GEPF’s prior participation in PAIDF I or II? 7.6. PCV creation and GEPF impact 7.6.1. Regarding the creation of the PCV, could you confirm whether the GEPF incurred any losses, impairments, write-downs, or adverse valuation adjustments from a pure accounting or profitability standpoint? 7.6.2. If so, please detail the amounts and their basis. 7.7. DBSA involvement 7.7.1. Was the DBSA at any stage an investor, lender, or creditor to any Harith-managed fund or to any of the portfolio companies within those funds? 7.7.2. If yes, please specify the nature and quantum of that exposure. 7.8. Pending applications for funding 7.8.1. Does Harith currently have any pending applications and whether for funding, refinancing, restructuring, or borrowing, before the PIC or GEPF? 7.8.2. If so, would you kindly identify each application and indicate its current status? 8. The Thabiso Moshikara scandal in July 2025 8.1. Further I point to 7.3 in my letter of 29 October 2025, regarding the above the UDM would suggest that SCOF ask the following questions of the PIC based further on “Levoca reaffirms its commitment to ethical business practices and remains committed to connecting our communities with fast internet access and bridging the digital divide in South Africa” 8.1.1. The Metrofibre Investment Funding of Levoca was stated in the Annual Financial Report of 2024 of the GEPF as having profited the PIC/GEPF just over R100 million in the span of one year. Why was this deal cancelled, and why were the shares seized for the alleged R1,170.00 postage and stamp fees of Bowmans Attorneys on a deal worth over R1.4 billion? 8.1.2. A case of fraud and corruption has been opened against PIC Head of Legal Lindiwe Masina Dlamini on 07 August 2025, under case number 2025-08-07 at MIDRAND Station, reference number CAS 205/8/2025, by a PIC 8.1.3. whistleblower. The case has now been referred to the Hawks. Why has she not been suspended if Mr Thabiso Moshikara was suspended under the same circumstances? 8.1.4. Who in the PIC authorised the granting of a R1.4 billion legal indemnity to the privately owned company Metrofibre against another private company, Levoca 805, in pursuit of trying to recoup a mere R1,170.00 following the R3 million bribe allegations? 8.1.5. Is this not biased and proof that Levoca was being punished for not wanting to pay Mr Moshikara the R3 million bribe? 8.1.6. It is stated in a civil matter paper between PIC and Levoca 805 that the R1,170 invoice was erroneous or fraudulently issued, which supports the fact that the PIC is lacking a legitimate trigger event. Furthermore, the R1,170 was eventually settled by Levoca, yet the PIC still proceeded to seize Levoca’s shares worth R1.4 billion for R1,170. Why is the PIC still proceeding to seize the shares even after the R1,170, which it relied upon, was settled by Levoca, particularly in an investment that is profiting our government pensioners over R100 million per annum? 8.1.7. What is the current status of this matter? Where does it stand now? Have the shares been returned to Levoca, and if not, why not? 8.1.8. Is the PIC attempting to punish the whistleblower by seizing Levoca’s shares for R1,170? 8.1.9. Does this not sound like corrupt, prejudicial, and oppressive conduct to unlawfully seize Levoca's shares by the PIC as a result of Levoca refusing to pay a R3 million bribe to Mr Moshikara, Head of the Isibaya Fund at the PIC? 9. The Isibaya Fund 9.1. The Isibaya Fund continues to be the centre of corruption within the PIC. Despite the clear warnings of the Mpati Commission, no meaningful reforms have been implemented. This unlisted investment portfolio still operates with poor oversight, secretive decision-making, and transactions that favour politically connected individuals. 9.2. Ultimately, the people who have dedicated their careers to public service are not the true beneficiaries of this fund. It has effectively become a pool of capital reserved for a privileged few, often distributed without proper risk evaluation, exposing the PIC to substantial financial losses and betraying the trust of millions of workers whose pensions are at stake. 9.3. A credit loss ratio exceeding 39% is indefensible and reflects an alarming level of financial mismanagement. No credible institution would tolerate such extensive losses under the guise of economic empowerment. 9.4. Complex financial structures and contractual arrangements have been deliberately used to conceal the extent of this looting. Few fully understand the intricate deal-making mechanisms that enable it, but it is clear that something even more insidious than State Capture continues to thrive within the PIC. 9.5. Given persistent governance failures, it is essential to ask whether the Isibaya Fund should remain under the control of the PIC at all. A more prudent course would be to transfer its developmental and impact investment mandate to institutions with proven governance systems and sectoral expertise, such as the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) or the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). These entities are far better placed to ensure sound project evaluation, transparency, and accountability. The PIC’s role could then be confined to allocating funds under DBSA or IDC supervision, or outsourcing mandates to qualified independent managers operating under strict risk and performance controls. Unless this reform is undertaken, corruption and instability will persist, and no commission of inquiry will be able to restore confidence or integrity to the system. 10. The UDM reiterates its firm belief that safeguarding public pension funds is a matter of national priority. Urgent intervention is required to ensure that the Public Investment Corporation is never exploited as an instrument of political patronage, and that the more than R3 trillion in assets under its management are administered with the utmost integrity, professionalism, and accountability. Yours sincerely Deputy Minister Bantu Holomisa, MP President of the United Democratic Movement Copied to: • Mr Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa – President of the Republic of South Africa • Mr Enoch Godongwana, MP - Minister of Finance • Dr David Masondo, MP - Deputy Minister of Finance and Chairperson of the Board of the Public Investment Corporation • Ms Thoko Didiza, MP - Speaker of the National Assembly of South Africa • Mr Songezo Zibi, MP - Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts • Mr Patrick Dlamini - Chief Executive Officer, Public Investment Corporation • Mr Musa Mabesa - Principal Executive Officer, Government Employees Pension Fund • Ms Tsakani Maluleke - Auditor-General of South Africa • Adv Andy Mothibi - Head of the Special Investigating Unit • Mr Eric Mabuza – Mabuza Attorneys • Mr Nqabayomzi Kwankwa, MP -UDM Deputy President and Leader in Parliament • Ms Thandi Nontenja, MP – UDM Chief Whip in the National Assembly and Member of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts