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Vision

We are the political home of all South Africans, united in the spirit of South Africanism by our common passion for our Country, mobilising the creative power inherent in our rich diversity, towards our transformation into a Winning Nation.

Mission

We will unite South Africans from all communities in a new political home, built on the foundation of the principles and ideals of our National Constitution. To this end we will address poverty and imbalances in our society, inspired by our unifying love of our Country and its people.

Core Values

The Core Values, which the United Democratic Movement will uphold and promote and upon which its fundamental policy positions are based, are as follow : respect for life, dignity and human worth of every individual; integrity in public- and private life; the individual rights and freedoms enshrined in our Country’s Constitution;

President of the UDM

Mr Bantu Holomisa

Major General (Retired) Bantubonke ‘Bantu’ Holomisa co-founded the United Democratic Movement (UDM) on 27 September 1997, and serves as its elected President, which in 2022 celebrated its 25th year of existence. He was again elected as a Member of Parliament in the 2024 National and Provincial Elections and was appointed as the Deputy Minister of Defence and Military Veterans in the Government of National Unity in the 7th Administration in President Cyril Ramaphosa’s cabinet.

He was the Commander of the Transkei Defence Force and Head of the Transkei Government (former independent homeland from 1987 to 1994) up to the first National Elections in South Africa in 1994. He was one of the first two black persons accepted by the South African Army College to do a one-year senior staff course for officers in 1984.

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UDM VICTORIES

UDM Victory on the Campaign for Transparent and Equitable Party Funding

Since its inception, the UDM has advocated for transparency in party funding. The party has aligned itself with the views of organisations like the (now defunct) Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa (Idasa), which recognised that transparency benefits the public interest. At that time, a common trend was for large businesses to donate to parties in government or before elections, often with the expectation of securing government contracts once the party gained power. This practice persisted over the years. For years, the major political parties declined to make their financial records public, fuelling the perception that they were influenced by wealthy donors. Meanwhile, the UDM stood alone, advocating for transparency and consistently pushing for openness regarding party finances. The UDM’s efforts were finally validated in 2019 with the enactment of the Political Party Funding Act. This law mandates parties to disclose donations above a certain threshold from any single donor. It also bars contributions from foreign governments or state entities. Moreover, it strictly regulates donations, specifying that they must be for party political purposes and received by party members on behalf of the party. It’s unfortunate that with the signing of the Electoral Amendment Act on the eve of the 2024 National and Provincial Elections, President Ramaphosa has rolled back many of the gains for our multi-party democracy. This action means that the African National Congress once again receives the largest portion of party funding.

UDM Victory on the the Establishment if the Mpati Commission

In May 2018, the UDM penned a letter to President Ramaphosa and then serving as Deputy Chief Justice, Raymond Zondo, highlighting alleged corruption at the Public Investment Corporation (PIC). The allegations centred on serious corruption, evasion of due diligence, misrepresentation, money laundering, and staff purging (potentially for a cover-up) in PIC deals. These actions posed a significant risk to the Government Employees Pension Fund pensioners and the pensions of government employees. The UDM continued to exert pressure on government by adding information to the original complaint. The UDM’s persistent advocacy on the issue prompted the establishment of the Mpati Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Impropriety regarding the Public Investment Corporation. This commission was established by presidential proclamation in October 2018. The UDM’s stance was validated by the findings and recommendations of the Mpati Commission, which were released in 2020. As of 2023, the party continues to advocate for the implementation of these recommendations.

UDM Victory on the the NSFAS R2million rental scandal

In February 2023, the UDM uncovered significant wasteful expenditure at the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS). This revelation came at a time when students were experiencing delays in receiving their payments, and some were being denied access to much-needed funds altogether. NSFAS had relocated to a new building using a turn-key solution, resulting in a substantial increase in rental costs. The monthly rent reportedly escalated from R500,000 to R1,968,647.05, despite many offices in the new premises remaining unused. This expenditure was deemed wasteful by the UDM. Furthermore, NSFAS allegedly purchased new furniture for the office space, amounting to millions of rands, instead of utilising existing furniture from their former offices. In light of these findings, the UDM called upon the Hawks and the Special Investigating Unit to conduct a thorough investigation into the matter. The troubles at NSFAS worsened with the removal of CEO Andile Nongogo in October 2023 due to investigations into alleged irregularities. Following this, in April 2024, Ernest Khosa stepped down as chair of the board amidst accusations and counter-accusations of corruption. The situation at NSFAS deteriorated further when the board was dissolved, and an administrator was appointed shortly thereafter. The blame for the mess should be laid squarely at Minister Blade Nzimande’s door.

UDM Open Letters

23 Sep 2020
Holomisa submission to the state capture commission: the real mastermind behind state capture
Deputy Chief Justice RMM Zondo Chairperson of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture PO Box 31322 Braamfontein 2017 Per the acting Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture Dear Sir SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION: THE REAL MASTERMIND BEHIND STATE CAPTURE 1. Corruption: a cancerous tumour 1.1. One of government’s major mistakes is delaying the implementation process to deal with corruption and addressing maladministration. It is evident that incompetence and corruption has collapsed and downgraded this country, thereby costing our economy billions of Rands. As a result of this undesirable culture, many municipalities have crumbled, because there are no effective structures to stop corruption, and to prevent maladministration and mismanagement of funds. 1.2. We acknowledge that measures have been taken, such as the formation of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture (‘the Commission’) so that it may establish who has captured the state, but the process has been laborious and, in our view, not nearly far-reaching enough. 1.3. The former Public Protector, Professor Thuli Madonsela, had revealed that the Gupta family had effectively captured the state, however, as it turns out, the real architect of corruption is the ruling party itself, the African National Congress (ANC). 1.4. Accordingly, the Commission has been making the ruling party’s head honchos account for their alleged acts of corruption, but there is much more to this iceberg than what is presented to the public. Although the media and opposition parties, like the United Democratic Movement, have exposed some of the ANC and their leaders’ misdeeds, I believe most of it is kept diligently under wraps, because it might be the lurking iceberg that finally sinks the ANC Titanic. 1.5. The ANC and its leaders have misused state funds through companies like Bosasa, Chancellor House, Mohlaleng Media and Maverick State, to mention but a few. Looting from public resources has become a habitual act to fund the ANC by whatever means necessary, whether it be by paying its cadres’ exorbitant salaries or financing their election campaigns by any means necessary. 1.6. It is repulsive that this brazen looting takes place right under the noses of the authorities, whilst parliament’s oversight has not been effective either. The powers of the accounting officers have been usurped by the executive, consequently it has also affected the performance of state-owned enterprises. 1.7. The Commission’s terms of reference states that your work shall be guided by the Public Protector’s state capture report and we have noticed from the testimony that other accounts of corruption have been creeping out of the woodwork. It is therefore evident that there is a ‘big picture’ corruption that must be looked at. 1.8. Whilst much is made of Guptagate implicating former President Zuma and some other insatiable cadres, the fact that the corruption and looting at all spheres of government is to the benefit of the ANC itself, is negated. The Commission should therefore investigate the involvement of the ANC in acts of corruption, in totality. 1.9. This institutionalised corruption is not new, and it can be traced back through the previous decades. Even the Commission of inquiry into allegations of impropriety regarding Public Investment Corporation (‘PIC Commission’) quoted my testimony where I said that: “One of the most difficult tasks regarding dealing with the type of corruption that is alleged to have happened at the PIC is the sophisticated nature of the transactions. Corruption can come in two forms, legal and illegal corruption. Legal corruption occurs when the elite build a legal framework that protects corruption or manipulate existing legal framework without necessarily breaking the law.” 1.10. The PIC Commission concurred with my statement when they said in their report to the President that: “When going through the story of Harith, these words resonate. The layering of legal entities (state owned corporations, pension funds, banks, companies and trusts and partnerships etc.), when applied by financiers and corporate structure experts, can make finding the substance, and not form, of a transaction or series of transactions complex and quite perplexing. These layers also give the players in such a formation use ‘plausible deniability’ most effectively, as looking through all the conducts is challenging and time consuming.” 1.11. This designed incompetence permeates our law enforcement agencies, such as the police, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (Hawks), the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), which all have dismally failed to investigate and prosecute the reported culprits. One must be honest in one’s assessment of the competence of the state’s investigative and judicial resources. It is a given that the state lacks such competence in all respects, whilst the same is further exacerbated by means of prevalent corruption within the ranks of these institutions themselves. 1.12. The gate keepers of maladministration are the incompetent key administrative personnel who have been deliberately appointed (deployed) to accomplish the agenda of looting state resources on behalf of the ANC and, of course, to feed their own personal greed. It must be borne in mind that the ANC’s cadre deployment policy is just another form of corruption. It is called nepotism for a reason, because making appointments based on party affiliation, friendship and familial connections violate the statute books and is patently wrong. Cadre deployment deprives our civil service of talented individuals and we have thousands of young South Africans with degrees who cannot find jobs. 1.13. Epidemic levels of corruption handicaps service delivery which results in many violent protests. Not only that, prospective international investors shun South Africa because of the high levels of corruption and sadly our people are paying the price. Ultimately, corruption is destroying the gains of our freedom and patriotic South Africans have lost all hope and endlessly question the so-called measures put in place to address this untenable situation, whilst the ruling party itself perpetuates corruption in order to sustain itself. 1.14. Let us remind ourselves of what the late, former President Nelson Mandela admitted, already in 1998, about corruption in South Africa: “Unfortunately there are officials who betray their calling… this is part of the wider cancer of corruption that is undermining our efforts in all areas of society. We have learnt now that even those people with whom we fought the struggle against apartheid’s corruption can themselves become corrupted.” 1.15. The sad state of affairs is that the liberators of yesteryear have become the perpetuators of this immoral pillaging of state resources, whilst we are misdirected in our focus on the Gupta’s involvement in state capture. 1.16. The true architects of state capture are those who run government and its institutions in collusion with certain elements within the private sector. The private sector, which particularly benefits from government tenders, is represented by individuals who are shareholders in large corporations. These individuals appear to represent the private sector, but instead they use corporate fronts that merely return the loot to the ANC. These individuals also represent the corrupt interests of the ruling party in that they are either ANC stalwarts or that they are connected in one or other compromising manner to that party, politically or otherwise. 2. A Nelson Mandela Bay example: Mohlaleng Media, the ANC’s access to public funds 2.1. The purpose of this letter is to request the Commission to investigate the mechanisms used in government institutions to misuse state funds, especially at local government level. 2.2. I was recently briefed, on the matters which I raise below, by Mr Werner Wiehart, a persecuted forensic investigator formerly employed by the Nelson Mandela Bay (NMB) Metropolitan Municipality. He indicated to me that he had forwarded the information to numerous political parties and as well as the Commission (See Annexure A), but I took the liberty to meet with him last week and wish to report the matter to you formally. 2.3. The matter centres on how municipal funds have been looted by the ANC over, at least, the past fifteen years in NMB. Some information is already in the public domain including those that have been reported to the police, Hawks, NPA and the Public Protector. 2.4. The documentary evidence, which I have in my possession, convinced me that there is prima facie evidence that NMB municipal funds were looted for the ANC’s benefit, to fund its operations and to sustain itself. Questionable entities or companies (which are non-compliant with tax obligations and also lack related tax and billing clearances) and the registration of multiple enterprises simultaneously, are used as tools to achieve their dastardly goals. 2.5. Furthermore, I noted that law enforcement agencies remain actionless where corruption in the NMB municipality, more often than not, remains uninvestigated – in some cases, for more than three years. I cannot over-emphasise my concern if this is the alacrity with which this government is driving the fight against corruption, whilst little or nothing is achieved to start off with. 2.6. The widely publicised NMB Integrated Public Transport System (IPTS) scandal, in which National Treasury is implicated, is simply not being addressed, except for a single case in court. National Treasury, with particular reference the Chief Director, Mr Jan Hatting, had apparently been informed in writing during October 2012 of the large-scale looting, yet with such knowledge National Treasury continued to make payments thus feeding the large-scale looting scheme over a period of a further three years. So, nothing is happening, whilst the thieves are still trawling through personal protective equipment (PPE) tenders to rake in money to fund the ANC’s campaign for the 2021 municipal elections. 2.7. The evidence in my possession shows that, according to Mr Wiehart, there were three key players from Luthuli House involved, namely, Mr Pravin Gordhan (then Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs), Dr Crispian Olver (famous author of “How to Steal a City: The Battle for Nelson Mandela Bay: An Inside Account) and Mr Cheslyn Mostert (a well-known ANC operator), who presented themselves as those mandated to address the NMB municipality’s issues; a process which led to the appointment of Mr Danny Jordaan as executive mayor and Mr Johann Mettler as acting city manager. 2.8. The same process led to the suspension (with full pay) of some municipal officials and their subsequent resignations, as well as some limited dismissals. Amongst others, these suspensions and resignations were caused by the allegations that some of the employees benefited from the IPTS deal. 2.9. Prior to the aforementioned ‘Luthuli House intervention”, the opposition, the media and the people were voicing out their anger about the IPTS corruption and as a result our Mr Mongameli Bobani, an ordinary councillor at that point in time, asked the Public Protector in October 2014 to investigate the matter. The Public Protector’s Advocate Tom had apparently investigated, but the final report was never made public. The municipality had appointed legal firms which have cost the rate payer more than R100 million over three years. 2.10. The evidence shows that the hand of Dr Olver extends beyond ‘helping the municipality’, but that he also played a role in the mismanagement of funds which were channelled to the ANC through a company called Mohlaleng Media, which served exclusively as the propaganda machinery of the ruling party in NMB. In this email Dr Olver informs the acting city manager that: “Here are the two CVs from Cheslyn, together with the draft letter to be signed and sent back to him, and the rates for the resources has set out in the SLA. The start date in the letter needs to be changed to Monday Next Week.” 2.12. A “tender” for R7,5 million was awarded to Mohlaleng Media, however the municipality failed to comply with its obligations in terms of the Municipal Finance Management Act to conclude the prescribed SLA which had to be signed between the municipality and Mohlaleng Media prior to commencement of any services. In fact, on assessment of the information, it is evident that Mohlaleng Media’s bid is riddled with fraudulent information, whilst even the entire procurement process was rigged from inception in favour of Mohlaleng Media. 2.13. Mohlaleng Media operated from December 2014 to February 2016 before any so-called SLA was signed on a fraudulent basis and of course the ratepayer footed the bill. This so-called SLA is referred to as an addendum to a former SLA, which never existed, hence, fraud. The tender/contract period entailed three years, however the bid value of R7,5 million had already been exhausted within the first ten months of the contract period. 2.14. Documentary evidence reveals that Mohlaleng Media invoices merely claimed monthly “resource cost” which eventually reached the amount of more than R21 million versus the actual approved bid value of R7,5 million over three years. These invoices were specifically created in such a manner to conceal the true nature of the work/service performed by this ANC aligned communications machine. 3. Mohlaleng Media forensic investigations, the cover-up and harassment of an investigator 3.1. One of the things I noticed as I went through these files is the harassment of Mr Wiehart by the office of the then Democratic Alliance executive mayor, Mr Athol Trollip, and his chief of staff together with the then acting city manager, Mr Johann Mettler. The harassment resulted in the malicious suspension of one of the municipal auditors based on fabricated and trumped-up charges and who was eventually expelled in a collusive manner. 3.2. The quarrel stemmed from Mohlaleng Media, which was used to generate ANC campaign material for the 2016 local government elections. (see pictures on the right) 3.3. An internal investigation had been done regarding Mohlaleng Media during which the Chief Audit Executive and forensic investigator, Mr Wiehart, questioned Mr Mettler’s involvement, which clearly caused discomfort in some quarters given the backlash that followed. 3.4. After Mr Trollip became aware that Mr Mettler and Dr Olver were implicated in the internal investigation on Mohlaleng Media, he had the terms of reference that was prepared by the internal audit team changed and, in essence, had it watered down in order to intentionally and actively conceal ANC corruption using an external forensic inquiry. In fact, Mr Mettler drafted the terms of reference for the external audit, which was a clear conflict of interest. The new terms of reference did not require the investigation of Mr Mettler and Dr Olver’s involvement, which was obviously intentional and self-serving. 3.5. A certain Morrison and Vermeulen were appointed on 31 May 2017, with the new terms of reference, whilst Mr Wiehart was placed on compulsory special leave, during which he was persecuted on the basis of fabricated charges of misconduct. Morrison and Vermeulen apparently performed very poorly, and in fact showed little progress. Mr Morrison furnished a preliminary report on 6 November 2017. 3.6. Mr Morrison’s final report does not contain the factual findings that were communicated to him since May 2017, nor did he make any reference to evidence furnished to him by a whistle-blower whose disclosures are included in the documents that I have now studied. 3.7. Same resulted in the comprehensive Chief Audit Executive review queries in that Mr Morrison had simply not performed, but more concerning is the fact that he collusively acted with Mr Mettler in concealment of impropriety by Mr Mettler, Dr Olver and others. 3.8. From the evidence before me, Mr Morrison is in all probability a compromised individual who did not render the service that he was appointed and paid for. This is how entrenched corruption is in our society, that even external forensic consultants are prepared to engage in the very same cancerous agenda that society is attempting to eradicate. 3.9. According to Mr Wiehart, Mr Trollip had even gone so far as to hide documents at his residence for a period of twenty-six months after a forensic report was furnished to a Hawks investigator in March 2018. Mr Trollip may say that he was the one who mandated the investigation, yet he must be made to account for his collusive actions in protection of corrupt officials and politicians. 3.10. This entire narrative raises a concern, which is that “the system” used in NMB to loot funds through companies like Mohlaleng Media could be, and probably is, “the system” that is replicated in other municipalities (and even other spheres of government) in favour of the corrupt and looting ruling party. 4. The leaked CR17 campaign bank statements: the same names crop up 4.1. Mr Wiehart further took me into confidence and shared information with me that relates to Linkd Environmental Services of which Dr Olver is, at the moment, the sole director. This three-man operation in 2017 entered into an SLA with Ria Tenda Trust (which belongs to President Ramaphosa) to provide accounting and financial services (https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/download/file/fid/1649) This is rather odd, because Linkd Environmental Services is not a financial services or accounting firm at all. What had apparently piqued Mr Wiehart interest had been that, given what had transpired in NMB, that this might be a case of history repeating itself. 4.2. I was shown some of the various leaked bank statements, that are quite easily accessible on social media platforms and, even though they have been sealed by the court , they therefore can never enjoy protection from public scrutiny. 4.3. What can be seen from these bank statements is that a bank account was utilised to channel alleged CR17 campaign funding. I find it questionable that the principals segregated so-called day to day business operations, with alleged campaign donations, as one would expect that separate trust accounts be opened and be managed in a transparent manner. 4.4. What was however of much interest to me, given the context of this submission, was that these statements showed the involvement of the very same individuals involved in the NMB/Mohlaleng Media corruption. They are Maverick State (formerly known as Mohlaleng Media), Crispian Olver, Cheslyn Mostert, Grant Pascoe, Vukile Pokwana and some others. 4.5. I was also shocked by some of the names of the listed beneficiaries, where I saw that many members of the ANC received money, totalling millions of Rands, in their personal bank accounts. Although, I hold no brief for the ANC as an organisation, I am concerned about Crispian Olver and Cheslyn Mostert’s seeming endgame. Whilst on the one hand, their hands may loom large in the corruption that has been taking place in NMB and on the other hand, Dr Olver’s company is alleged to have distributed millions of Rands to ANC members. There seems to be a strange disconnect between those actions. 4.6. That said, my concern is that, from where exactly did the funding in Dr Olver’s company bank account originate. On review of the deposits, it is evident that these origins are not vested in well-known and/or credible corporate resources from the private sector. Considering how Mohlaleng Media was used to fund and sustain the ruling party’s ever-hungry hyenas in NMB, one cannot believe that there is any legitimacy behind the so-called donor funding from private individuals or corporations. 4.7. Who are the real ‘donors’ and from where does such funding truly originate? Looking closely at the methodology used by Bosasa, and what could possibly be used by Linkd Environmental Services, one is left with unanswered questions as to who the real architects of state capture are. This is the actual question that must be considered, and investigated, by the Commission. 4.8. The innocuous words ‘donor funds’ are constantly used, whilst the biggest and most important ‘donor’ is the state through the looting of public funds. These so-called donor funds emanate directly from state contracts and government tenders and not from happy and morally complacent ANC supporters. 5. Conclusion 5.1. To verify the authenticity of the information contained in this submission, the Commission should consider conducting a preliminary investigation by engaging Mr Werner Wiehart. All the documentation I have scrutinised is available on request. 5.2. Furthermore, to aid its work, the Commission would be well advised to request the Public Protector’s report on its 2014/15 investigation of the NMB municipality’s IPTS system, as well as all the NMB corruption cases that have been reported to the police, Hawks, SIU and the NPA. 6. Parting shot: the money must be recovered from the ANC 6.1. We, at the moment, spend a lot of time talking about corruption and plumbing its depths, which is of course right. But we must also emphasise the imperative that all the moneys that have been pilfered through tender rigging, as was done with the eye-opening Bosasa shenanigans, in favour of ANC linked companies, or ANC leaders and linked individuals or the party itself, must be recuperated. 6.2. Tracing exactly into whose pocket the money went might look like an insurmountable task, and it probably will be a massive operation. But not tackling this task, would be short-changing South Africans from the moneys that should have been spent to make manifest their constitutional rights. Simple as that. 8. I remain at your disposal. Yours sincerely Mr Bantu Holomisa, MP President of the United Democratic Movement Copied to: • President of the Republic, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa • Minister of Finance, Mr Tito Mboweni • Speaker of the National Assembly, Ms Thandi Modise, for the relevant portfolio committees’ attention • NMB acting Executive Mayor, Cllr Thsonono Buyeye • NMB acting City Manager, Mr Mandla George
10 Sep 2020
DHET: further allegations of Minister Nzimande’s political interference: appointment of SACP cronies
Dear President Ramaphosa DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND TRAINING: FURTHER ALLEGATIONS OF MINISTER NZIMANDE’S POLITICAL INTERFERENCE: APPOINTMENT OF PARTY CRONIES 1. I refer to my letters of 24 and 31 August 2020 regarding allegations of interference of the political head of the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET), the Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology, Dr Blade Nzimande, in departmental processes and administration, as well as the undermining of the senior departmental accounting officers. 2. Minister Nzimande’s alleged direct interference in procurement processes, such as what apparently happened with the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) laptop tender, clearly has disastrous consequences. This much vaunted project has flopped; everyone sits with egg on their faces and our students are left right where they started, without learning devices. NSFAS’s feeble attempt to mitigate the damage, effectively blaming a total of 150 bidders for “getting it wrong”, is almost laughable. 3. It has now come to my attention that Minister Nzimande was allegedly directly involved in twelve DHET appointments in the 2019/20 financial year that were not made in line with Public Service Regulations (PSR) and/or the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) 1 of 1999. 4. The salaries of these twelve allegedly irregularly appointed individuals cost the taxpayer around R9,7 million a year, but once you consider the allegation that the majority of them are South African Communist Party comrades of the Minister, their appointments take another flavour and one can see why the regulations were seemingly so grossly flouted. 5. It is alleged that, in March 2020, five employees additional to the DHET establishment were appointed, but that there were no logic or justification for the creation of these posts in terms of Section 57(2) of the PSR. Apparently, the posts were not even advertised. I also understand that there was no appointment committee and no competency assessments were conducted as required by Section 67(1). Lastly, there were allegedly no vetting or checking of qualifications in terms of Section 57(3). These appointments are:   6. Another alleged appointment where the Minister had a hand in, is that of a 12-month contract of a Deputy Director-General Planning, Policy and Training, whilst this post already existed in the department establishment and it was vacant. The story with this appointment is the same as with the previous five; none of the PSR prescriptions were adhered to. 7. Two staff members were allegedly headhunted, whilst this is only allowed in terms of the DHET Recruitment and Selection Policy under certain circumstances as described in Section 2.1.6. For some reasons, apparently known only to the Minister, they were both headhunted after only one failed advertisement and the process was not conducted by a recruitment agency. Also, apparently, no verification of their qualifications has been done; they are: 8. The last four instances where the Minister apparently had a hand in are listed below, and as I understand it, there is no evidence on file, that indicates that their qualifications/studies and employment verifications were performed prior to their appointment as is required by Section 67(9a) of the PSR. 9. Much as the blustering rationalisations and irritable explanations come from the Minister, no amount of spin-doctoring can camouflage the dysfunction within the DHET, the Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) and NSFAS. 10. Given the information that you have, I am interested to know what actions you have taken, or plan to take, to address these serious allegations against Minister Nzimande? Have you, at all, considered the United Democratic Movement’s call to suspend him? If not, why not? 11. Lastly, in the interest of setting the record straight, I also refer you to Minister Nzimande’s use of a ministerial briefing to strike at me and his use of a manipulative lie when he said I have an interest in doing business with his department. I wonder how he justifies conscientiously executing his oath of office if a lie is so easily told using a government platform. I wish to place on record that I am not the businessman he disparaged me to be, and that I have no interests, nor have I ever had, in any companies that do business with government and/or any of its entities. I have, in an effort to clear this up with the Honourable Minister, gone to the extent of offering to engage him on this topic on any live radio or television platform of his choice, but the response from his corner has, thus far, been mute. Yours sincerely Mr Bantu Holomisa, MP President of the United Democratic Movement  
31 Aug 2020
PSETA: Minister Nzimande’s alleged manipulation and political interference in the appointments of the board, chairperson and CEO
Dear Mr President PSETA: MINISTER NZIMANDE’S ALLEGED MANIPULATION AND POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN THE APPOINTMENTS OF THE BOARD, CHAIRPERSON AND CEO 1. I refer to my letter to you, dated 24 August 2020, regarding the alleged direct interference of the political head of the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET), the Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology, Dr Blade Nzimande, in that department’s administration. Although I have not received a formal acknowledgement of receipt, the Presidency’s automated stock-email response, indicates that you are in receipt thereof. 2. I would like to bring to your attention further information I received pertaining to the Minister’s conduct, in what appears to be interference and manipulation of the administrative process leading to the appointment of the board and chairperson of the Public Service Sector Education and Training Authority (PSETA) as well as the chief executive officer (CEO). 3. Appointment of PSETA board 3.1. The fact that Minister Nzimande twice advertised, at the end of 2019 and the beginning of 2020, the call for appointments to the Sector Education and Training Authority (SETA) boards is a fact. His unexplained reasoning for doing so is, however, open to criticism for several reasons. 3.2. Regarding the 2019-round, I am told that the PSETA employed a selection process that considered merit, continuity, and the requirements of stakeholder representation. Its recommendations were forwarded to the DHET for approval. Yet, it is alleged that the Minister did not make appointments for reasons known only to him, but rather directed for the process to be re-opened. This came as a surprise to PSETA, as I suspect other SETAs, since they had already gone through their long-used process with which they are familiar. 3.3. It must be noted that PSETA apparently did not receive any new nominations during the second round of a request for nominations. This meant that recommendations made to the Minister in 2019 were relevant for appointment. It must be noted that a nomination of a certain Mr Thulani Tshefuta was apparently received during the initial nominations for board appointment but was rejected as he did not meet the requirements. The relevance of this specific allegation will become apparent later in this letter and the Minister must explain this phenomenon. 3.4. PSETA recommended a full roster of six names allocated to organised labour representatives, yet the Minister for some odd reason, appointed five, one of whom did not receive an appointment letter, thus leaving the two existing vacancies. The Minister, again without explaining himself, only made two of PSETA’s recommended reappointments. 3.5. There are two persons, namely Mr Lewis Nzimande (community organisations’ representative) and Ms Linda Dube (organised employers’ representative), who the Minister has seemingly unilaterally appointed. PSETA apparently has no records, such as curriculum vitae and the background check, ordinarily undertaken by Managed Integrity Evaluation (MIE), on file. These documents are crucial for audit purposes. 3.6. The directive by the Minister for re-advertisement without providing reasons and the subsequent appointment of board members who were not recommended nor nominated through PSETA processes is indicative of an abuse of power and manipulation of a regulated process by Minister Nzimande. 3.7. The critical question here is, was this entire exercise merely an attempt to satisfy compliance, whilst the Minister had his own agenda? 3.8. Furthermore, the Minister’s “double advertising” imposed time pressures, which resulted in the newly appointed board being unprepared and they allegedly fell prey to the CEO, Ms Bontle Lerumo, causing them to make decisions before they received a hand-over report and induction, and before they could familiarise themselves with the organisation and previous board resolutions. This is a dangerous set of circumstances, but when one considers the allegation that Ms Lerumo is a confederate of the Minister and Mr Mabuza Ngubane (the Director SETA Performance Management whom I referred to in my previous letter), matters take a shadier turn. 4. Appointment of PSETA chairperson 4.1. Regulation 14(2) of the “Standard Constitution of SETA regulations associated with the Skills Development Act 26 of 2011” was amended in 2017, ironically by Minister Nzimande himself, to allow for SETA board chairpersons to serve two terms of office. 4.2. The motivation had been to ensure continuity and organisational stability. I therefore suspect that all the SETAs were stunned when the Minister directed the advertising of the chairpersonships in late 2019. For reasons known only to the Minister this call was reopened in early 2020. 4.3. The Minister, in essence, unilaterally limited the former PSETA chairperson’s service to one term, this despite the spirit of the aforementioned amendment. I however found it extremely disturbing that the Minister, also for reasons known only to him, decided to appoint Mr Thulani Tshefuta (to whom I referred in Paragraph 3.3) as PSETA board chairperson. It is surprising that he emerged as the chairperson of the board when he did not meet the requirements for the board. 5. Appointment of PSETA CEO 5.1. As I understand it, the appointment of CEOs is in line with the SETAs’ five-year licencing period and that the SETAs’ executive committees and boards (assisted by corporate services) take responsibility for this process. Ms Lerumo’s contract ended on 31 March 2020 but, to ensure smooth transition, she must serve until 30 September. 5.2. This NQF Level 9 post was advertised in two Sunday newspapers and on PSETA’s website, but shortly thereafter the advert was recalled and re-placed (this time only on the website) with an erratum specifically lowering the level of academic qualifications. Why on earth was this done, if not to accommodate a certain applicant? 5.3. Shortlisting evidently took place and, Ms Lerumo, whom I hear does not possess an NQF Level 9 qualification, was amongst the top three performers recommended to the Minister possibly due to the new board’s inexperience and some irregular influence. 5.4. There is already an indication that the Minister refused the top candidate, because he did not know him/her. The initial list of recommended candidates is available, and should the appointment not be done according to this recommended list and Ms Lerumo is appointed, the Minister must be held accountable for flaunting the process in favour of his alleged collaborator. 5.5. It would also mean that the top candidate was discriminated against, because of the Minister’s personal preferences, and that the entire process is legally contestable in terms of our labour legislation. As a matter of fact, given the Minister’s reputation, there could be a wholesale legal action where these SETA CEO appointments are concerned. If the new PSETA board is confident that the process was fair and transparent, they should confidently supply you with all the relevant documentation. 6. Mr President, Minister Nzimande seems to be running DHET and the SETAs from his briefcase and in light of all the nauseating allegations against him that have risen of late, it is incumbent upon you and cabinet to intervene in the appointments of the SETA boards, chairpersons and CEO until the veracity of these allegations are established by your office. 7. This entire set of circumstances demonstrates Minister Nzimande’s seeming lack of duty of care as an executive authority in managing public resources and ensuring efficient public service. He appears to have demonstrated a high level of disregard for public service regulations, not acting in the interest of the public good and is not fit to be a minister and it is your responsibility to sort this out. Yours sincerely Mr Bantu Holomisa, MP President of the United Democratic Movement
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The United Democratic Movement (UDM) has worked diligently to promote the interests of all South Africans over the years. Despite the challenges and stumbling blocks the party rose to the occasion and scored many political victories. Our successes are manifested in our public representation at various levels of government across the country, but also in the influence we have had irrespective of the ruling party’s parliamentary majority.

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President Ramaphosa does not take the youth seriously!

President Ramaphosa does not take the youth seriously!

The United Democratic Movement Youth Vanguard (UDM Youth Vanguard) thinks President Cyril Ramaphosa lives in a fool’s paradise if he believes that his government will implement his big plans. Since Mr Ramaphosa became president, every speech has been full of optimism and plans for a new dawn, however South Africans have not seen any implementation. The UDM Youth Vanguard has a lingering question as to what exactly makes the President thinks his big plans are easily implementable and we would like to know if there is an effective strategy in place to successfully execute his plans. Our concern stems from the looting culture we recently witnessed with the Coronavirus pandemic, where government officials were accused of the abuse of state funds, as well as the severe maladministration of the President’s initiatives. A simple example is the dismal failure to implement the R350 special Covid-19 Social Relief of Distress Grant (SRD grant) as, to date, young unemployed South Africans have not received their full grants as promised. It is a struggle for the department of social development to disburse these grants every month to deserving beneficiaries. We strongly reject the assertion, and proffered statistics, that these SRD grants have helped young unemployed South Africans to live above the poverty line. We have experienced a ridiculous increase in food prices, therefore the R350 certainly is not enough to make a tangible difference. The statistics are misleading, and it surely does not represent the realities and hardships that young people daily face. It is repulsive to see the President addressing the nation with misleading information and this culture must be condemned The UDM Youth Vanguard would like the President to present an effective implementation strategy of all the plans he mentioned in his speech, more especially on his plans regarding job creation. We should be cognisant of the fact that thousands of South Africans have lost their jobs during the Covid-19 pandemic and therefore creating 800,000 jobs will not only be challenging, but insufficient. This kind of plan requires strong leadership and integrity which the current leadership has failed to provide to date. The President also needs to be specific regarding the duration of the employment, because it is unfair to create job opportunities that only last for a few months and thereafter the recipients must return to the unemployment benches. We refuse to call that job-creation and it cannot be documented on the statistics as it is demeaning and undignified. We call on President Ramaphosa to issue a directive to all departments with clear plans and implementation strategies, with timeframes, that clearly sets out how his plans must be implemented. Accordingly, those plans must be published so that young people can hold those departments and the relevant ministers accountable. Furthermore, young people are hungry for change and we are tired of empty promises. We want urgent change, and the government should respond with speed. President Ramaphosa must take the necessary measures to hold all government officials who are suspected of corruption to account. Suspend, fire and open criminal cases. The youth is ready to serve this nation and thereby better the lives of all our people. We cannot afford to continue on this slippery slope of corruption and degradation. Young South Africans do not need motivation, they have it is an innate ability. They do not want pity, they want change. Cut the red tape and make it possible for young people to thrive, work and build their own businesses and enhance their standard of living. Issued by: Mr Yongama Zigebe UDM Youth Vanguard

Minister Nzimande’s high-handed interference in appointment of Unisa vice-chancellor

Minister Nzimande’s high-handed interference in appointment of Unisa vice-chancellor

Dear Mr President MINISTER NZIMANDE’S HIGH-HANDED INTERFERENCE IN APPOINTMENT OF VICE-CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 1. Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology Dr Blade Nzimande’s interference in the departmental processes and administration of the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET), and that of the Sector Education and Training Authorities, have been reported to your office several times. 2. Seemingly Minister Nzimande’s ambitions do not stop there as he has set his sights on South Africa’s largest university, the University of South Africa (Unisa), in that he is directly interfering with the appointment of its vice-chancellor. 3. Sources indicate that Minister Nzimande had met with the Unisa council where he raised concern about three main issues: 3.1. The high number of students who yearly, directly enrol from high school at Unisa, a distance-learning institution, and the attending problems when these students agitate for National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) sponsorship and they expect the same kind of support as students at contact-learning institutions. 3.2. High failure rate. 3.3. Implication of the cost of new technologies on the operations of the university. 4. At this meeting, the Minister indicated that there was a need to review Unisa considering the aforementioned challenges. He also indicated that it would be the right time for the review as the term of office of the vice-chancellor would be coming to an end. The common understanding was that the process of appointing a new vice-chancellor would be delayed until the review was completed. 5. At a later stage, the Minister specifically stated that it was the council’s prerogative to appoint the vice-chancellor and that his interactions with the university’s governing bodies should not be misconstrued as interference on his part. What an odd thing to be pointing out, if that was not in fact exactly what he was doing. 6. The Ministerial Task Team that had been made responsible for the Unisa review, started in mid-July 2020 and it would be logical, that the outcome of the review would dictate who should be appointed to implement the review recommendations i.e. in terms of the needed qualifications, experience, skills, etc. This echoes the initial expectation that the vice-chancellor would be only appointed after the review, yet the process of the appointment is being forged ahead with, with the interference of the Minister. 7. Apparently out of the five candidates that had been shortlisted earlier this year, two had withdrawn and there were those in the university establishment that thought the net should be cast wider. However, on 13 October 2020, the council chairperson and a ministerial advisor had apparently announced that they had identified a preferred candidate and that there would be no need to identify more candidates. I understand that interviews were conducted on the 14th, and the earmarked candidate was in fact recommended. 8. It is said that the preferred candidate has raised concern amongst the Unisa management and staff as there is doubt about this person’s experience and qualifications and, also, that there are many South Africans who should be considered for appointment. 9. Unisa’s council is to convene on 21 October 2020 and is expected to rubberstamp the palace decree. It is also clear that a selection committee had only been put in place to satisfy the policy requirements and it served no actual purpose as the decision on who was to be appointed as Unisa’s vice-chancellor was a fait de accompli. 10. However, Unisa’s council will be tested on Wednesday, to see whether they will endorse a woefully dysfunctional process that was spearheaded by a person who is not even a civil servant. The involvement of the Minister’s ‘industrial envoy’, Mr Nqaba Nqandela, who is masquerading as a DHET representative, definitively compromises Minister Nzimande’s promise that he would not interfere in the vice-chancellor’s appointment. Who mandated Mr Nqandela to poke his nose into Unisa’s affairs? 11. We recommend that you ask Unisa’s council, the outgoing vice-chancellor, as well as the Ministerial Task Team to brief you on the need for the review, its progress, as well as the entire process around appointment of the vice-chancellor. 12. By implication, one would expect that Unisa’s council would postpone the consideration of this item on its agenda, on Wednesday, and that it would not endorse appointment of the parachuted-in candidate, until they have satisfied themselves that the minister’s involvement has not compromised prescribed processes and appointment policies. 13. Mr President, although we have written to your office many times, Minister Nzimande continues to use his briefcase lackeys to intimidate all and sundry in the higher education establishment and this must stop. Yours sincerely Mr Bantu Holomisa, MP President of the United Democratic Movement

Allegations of political interference by Minister Nzimande in CHIETA CEO appointment

Allegations of political interference by Minister Nzimande in CHIETA CEO appointment

Dear Mr President Allegations of political interference by Minister Nzimande in CHIETA CEO appointment 1. I have previously raised with you the alleged interference of the political head of the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET), the Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology, Dr Blade Nzimande, in that department’s administration and also in the management of the Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs). 2. Yesterday, the Chemical Industries Education and Training Authority (CHIETA) announced the appointment of Mr Yershen Pillay as its Chief Executive Officer. 3. Mr Pillay is a former Young Communist League chairperson and, according to our source, is a personal confidant of Minister Nzimande. In fact, in the communication to staff, announcing Mr Pillay’s appointment, Ms Wezi Khoza (Chairperson of the CHIETA Accounting Authority) flaunted that he works in the Minister’s office as Director Stakeholder Management. 4. To provide further information and context, I remind you of my 10 September 2020-letter  regarding the Minister’s reward scheme for party cronies, where his direct involvement is alleged in the creation of five DHET posts for which no logic or justification were provided in terms of the Public Service Regulations. Allegedly, these posts were not advertised; nor was there an appointment committee; nor were competency assessments conducted and no vetting or checking of qualifications were undertaken. 5. Mr Pillay was one of those lucky communists and received a whopping salary of just over R88,000 per month in the 2019/20 financial year. So, whilst business at the DHET is run like the Wild Wild West, Mr Pillay has been rewarded a second time, this time with a SETA CEO-ship. 6. Seen against the backdrop of the past allegations made around Dr Nzimande’s seeming empire building, Mr Pillay’s appointment is clearly another block in that structure, and one wonders at the goal. 7. Actions speak louder than words and no matter what Minister Nzimande says, he does not appear to be building a robust, merit-based higher education management system that works in service of South Africa for the long-term. 8. With due respect Sir, the lack of response from your office to the various matters I have raised relating to Minister Nzimande resembles ostrich politics. I therefore hope that you will break your silence on this topic with a definitive stance. 9. The United Democratic Movement will however in the meantime and in good faith persist in raising issues of national importance with you, in line with your cause to rid government of corruption. Yours sincerely Mr Bantu Holomisa, MP President of the United Democratic Movement

Holomisa submission to the state capture commission: the real mastermind behind state capture

Holomisa submission to the state capture commission: the real mastermind behind state capture

Deputy Chief Justice RMM Zondo Chairperson of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture PO Box 31322 Braamfontein 2017 Per the acting Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture Dear Sir SUBMISSION TO THE COMMISSION: THE REAL MASTERMIND BEHIND STATE CAPTURE 1. Corruption: a cancerous tumour 1.1. One of government’s major mistakes is delaying the implementation process to deal with corruption and addressing maladministration. It is evident that incompetence and corruption has collapsed and downgraded this country, thereby costing our economy billions of Rands. As a result of this undesirable culture, many municipalities have crumbled, because there are no effective structures to stop corruption, and to prevent maladministration and mismanagement of funds. 1.2. We acknowledge that measures have been taken, such as the formation of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture (‘the Commission’) so that it may establish who has captured the state, but the process has been laborious and, in our view, not nearly far-reaching enough. 1.3. The former Public Protector, Professor Thuli Madonsela, had revealed that the Gupta family had effectively captured the state, however, as it turns out, the real architect of corruption is the ruling party itself, the African National Congress (ANC). 1.4. Accordingly, the Commission has been making the ruling party’s head honchos account for their alleged acts of corruption, but there is much more to this iceberg than what is presented to the public. Although the media and opposition parties, like the United Democratic Movement, have exposed some of the ANC and their leaders’ misdeeds, I believe most of it is kept diligently under wraps, because it might be the lurking iceberg that finally sinks the ANC Titanic. 1.5. The ANC and its leaders have misused state funds through companies like Bosasa, Chancellor House, Mohlaleng Media and Maverick State, to mention but a few. Looting from public resources has become a habitual act to fund the ANC by whatever means necessary, whether it be by paying its cadres’ exorbitant salaries or financing their election campaigns by any means necessary. 1.6. It is repulsive that this brazen looting takes place right under the noses of the authorities, whilst parliament’s oversight has not been effective either. The powers of the accounting officers have been usurped by the executive, consequently it has also affected the performance of state-owned enterprises. 1.7. The Commission’s terms of reference states that your work shall be guided by the Public Protector’s state capture report and we have noticed from the testimony that other accounts of corruption have been creeping out of the woodwork. It is therefore evident that there is a ‘big picture’ corruption that must be looked at. 1.8. Whilst much is made of Guptagate implicating former President Zuma and some other insatiable cadres, the fact that the corruption and looting at all spheres of government is to the benefit of the ANC itself, is negated. The Commission should therefore investigate the involvement of the ANC in acts of corruption, in totality. 1.9. This institutionalised corruption is not new, and it can be traced back through the previous decades. Even the Commission of inquiry into allegations of impropriety regarding Public Investment Corporation (‘PIC Commission’) quoted my testimony where I said that: “One of the most difficult tasks regarding dealing with the type of corruption that is alleged to have happened at the PIC is the sophisticated nature of the transactions. Corruption can come in two forms, legal and illegal corruption. Legal corruption occurs when the elite build a legal framework that protects corruption or manipulate existing legal framework without necessarily breaking the law.” 1.10. The PIC Commission concurred with my statement when they said in their report to the President that: “When going through the story of Harith, these words resonate. The layering of legal entities (state owned corporations, pension funds, banks, companies and trusts and partnerships etc.), when applied by financiers and corporate structure experts, can make finding the substance, and not form, of a transaction or series of transactions complex and quite perplexing. These layers also give the players in such a formation use ‘plausible deniability’ most effectively, as looking through all the conducts is challenging and time consuming.” 1.11. This designed incompetence permeates our law enforcement agencies, such as the police, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (Hawks), the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), which all have dismally failed to investigate and prosecute the reported culprits. One must be honest in one’s assessment of the competence of the state’s investigative and judicial resources. It is a given that the state lacks such competence in all respects, whilst the same is further exacerbated by means of prevalent corruption within the ranks of these institutions themselves. 1.12. The gate keepers of maladministration are the incompetent key administrative personnel who have been deliberately appointed (deployed) to accomplish the agenda of looting state resources on behalf of the ANC and, of course, to feed their own personal greed. It must be borne in mind that the ANC’s cadre deployment policy is just another form of corruption. It is called nepotism for a reason, because making appointments based on party affiliation, friendship and familial connections violate the statute books and is patently wrong. Cadre deployment deprives our civil service of talented individuals and we have thousands of young South Africans with degrees who cannot find jobs. 1.13. Epidemic levels of corruption handicaps service delivery which results in many violent protests. Not only that, prospective international investors shun South Africa because of the high levels of corruption and sadly our people are paying the price. Ultimately, corruption is destroying the gains of our freedom and patriotic South Africans have lost all hope and endlessly question the so-called measures put in place to address this untenable situation, whilst the ruling party itself perpetuates corruption in order to sustain itself. 1.14. Let us remind ourselves of what the late, former President Nelson Mandela admitted, already in 1998, about corruption in South Africa: “Unfortunately there are officials who betray their calling… this is part of the wider cancer of corruption that is undermining our efforts in all areas of society. We have learnt now that even those people with whom we fought the struggle against apartheid’s corruption can themselves become corrupted.” 1.15. The sad state of affairs is that the liberators of yesteryear have become the perpetuators of this immoral pillaging of state resources, whilst we are misdirected in our focus on the Gupta’s involvement in state capture. 1.16. The true architects of state capture are those who run government and its institutions in collusion with certain elements within the private sector. The private sector, which particularly benefits from government tenders, is represented by individuals who are shareholders in large corporations. These individuals appear to represent the private sector, but instead they use corporate fronts that merely return the loot to the ANC. These individuals also represent the corrupt interests of the ruling party in that they are either ANC stalwarts or that they are connected in one or other compromising manner to that party, politically or otherwise. 2. A Nelson Mandela Bay example: Mohlaleng Media, the ANC’s access to public funds 2.1. The purpose of this letter is to request the Commission to investigate the mechanisms used in government institutions to misuse state funds, especially at local government level. 2.2. I was recently briefed, on the matters which I raise below, by Mr Werner Wiehart, a persecuted forensic investigator formerly employed by the Nelson Mandela Bay (NMB) Metropolitan Municipality. He indicated to me that he had forwarded the information to numerous political parties and as well as the Commission (See Annexure A), but I took the liberty to meet with him last week and wish to report the matter to you formally. 2.3. The matter centres on how municipal funds have been looted by the ANC over, at least, the past fifteen years in NMB. Some information is already in the public domain including those that have been reported to the police, Hawks, NPA and the Public Protector. 2.4. The documentary evidence, which I have in my possession, convinced me that there is prima facie evidence that NMB municipal funds were looted for the ANC’s benefit, to fund its operations and to sustain itself. Questionable entities or companies (which are non-compliant with tax obligations and also lack related tax and billing clearances) and the registration of multiple enterprises simultaneously, are used as tools to achieve their dastardly goals. 2.5. Furthermore, I noted that law enforcement agencies remain actionless where corruption in the NMB municipality, more often than not, remains uninvestigated – in some cases, for more than three years. I cannot over-emphasise my concern if this is the alacrity with which this government is driving the fight against corruption, whilst little or nothing is achieved to start off with. 2.6. The widely publicised NMB Integrated Public Transport System (IPTS) scandal, in which National Treasury is implicated, is simply not being addressed, except for a single case in court. National Treasury, with particular reference the Chief Director, Mr Jan Hatting, had apparently been informed in writing during October 2012 of the large-scale looting, yet with such knowledge National Treasury continued to make payments thus feeding the large-scale looting scheme over a period of a further three years. So, nothing is happening, whilst the thieves are still trawling through personal protective equipment (PPE) tenders to rake in money to fund the ANC’s campaign for the 2021 municipal elections. 2.7. The evidence in my possession shows that, according to Mr Wiehart, there were three key players from Luthuli House involved, namely, Mr Pravin Gordhan (then Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs), Dr Crispian Olver (famous author of “How to Steal a City: The Battle for Nelson Mandela Bay: An Inside Account) and Mr Cheslyn Mostert (a well-known ANC operator), who presented themselves as those mandated to address the NMB municipality’s issues; a process which led to the appointment of Mr Danny Jordaan as executive mayor and Mr Johann Mettler as acting city manager. 2.8. The same process led to the suspension (with full pay) of some municipal officials and their subsequent resignations, as well as some limited dismissals. Amongst others, these suspensions and resignations were caused by the allegations that some of the employees benefited from the IPTS deal. 2.9. Prior to the aforementioned ‘Luthuli House intervention”, the opposition, the media and the people were voicing out their anger about the IPTS corruption and as a result our Mr Mongameli Bobani, an ordinary councillor at that point in time, asked the Public Protector in October 2014 to investigate the matter. The Public Protector’s Advocate Tom had apparently investigated, but the final report was never made public. The municipality had appointed legal firms which have cost the rate payer more than R100 million over three years. 2.10. The evidence shows that the hand of Dr Olver extends beyond ‘helping the municipality’, but that he also played a role in the mismanagement of funds which were channelled to the ANC through a company called Mohlaleng Media, which served exclusively as the propaganda machinery of the ruling party in NMB. In this email Dr Olver informs the acting city manager that: “Here are the two CVs from Cheslyn, together with the draft letter to be signed and sent back to him, and the rates for the resources has set out in the SLA. The start date in the letter needs to be changed to Monday Next Week.” 2.12. A “tender” for R7,5 million was awarded to Mohlaleng Media, however the municipality failed to comply with its obligations in terms of the Municipal Finance Management Act to conclude the prescribed SLA which had to be signed between the municipality and Mohlaleng Media prior to commencement of any services. In fact, on assessment of the information, it is evident that Mohlaleng Media’s bid is riddled with fraudulent information, whilst even the entire procurement process was rigged from inception in favour of Mohlaleng Media. 2.13. Mohlaleng Media operated from December 2014 to February 2016 before any so-called SLA was signed on a fraudulent basis and of course the ratepayer footed the bill. This so-called SLA is referred to as an addendum to a former SLA, which never existed, hence, fraud. The tender/contract period entailed three years, however the bid value of R7,5 million had already been exhausted within the first ten months of the contract period. 2.14. Documentary evidence reveals that Mohlaleng Media invoices merely claimed monthly “resource cost” which eventually reached the amount of more than R21 million versus the actual approved bid value of R7,5 million over three years. These invoices were specifically created in such a manner to conceal the true nature of the work/service performed by this ANC aligned communications machine. 3. Mohlaleng Media forensic investigations, the cover-up and harassment of an investigator 3.1. One of the things I noticed as I went through these files is the harassment of Mr Wiehart by the office of the then Democratic Alliance executive mayor, Mr Athol Trollip, and his chief of staff together with the then acting city manager, Mr Johann Mettler. The harassment resulted in the malicious suspension of one of the municipal auditors based on fabricated and trumped-up charges and who was eventually expelled in a collusive manner. 3.2. The quarrel stemmed from Mohlaleng Media, which was used to generate ANC campaign material for the 2016 local government elections. (see pictures on the right) 3.3. An internal investigation had been done regarding Mohlaleng Media during which the Chief Audit Executive and forensic investigator, Mr Wiehart, questioned Mr Mettler’s involvement, which clearly caused discomfort in some quarters given the backlash that followed. 3.4. After Mr Trollip became aware that Mr Mettler and Dr Olver were implicated in the internal investigation on Mohlaleng Media, he had the terms of reference that was prepared by the internal audit team changed and, in essence, had it watered down in order to intentionally and actively conceal ANC corruption using an external forensic inquiry. In fact, Mr Mettler drafted the terms of reference for the external audit, which was a clear conflict of interest. The new terms of reference did not require the investigation of Mr Mettler and Dr Olver’s involvement, which was obviously intentional and self-serving. 3.5. A certain Morrison and Vermeulen were appointed on 31 May 2017, with the new terms of reference, whilst Mr Wiehart was placed on compulsory special leave, during which he was persecuted on the basis of fabricated charges of misconduct. Morrison and Vermeulen apparently performed very poorly, and in fact showed little progress. Mr Morrison furnished a preliminary report on 6 November 2017. 3.6. Mr Morrison’s final report does not contain the factual findings that were communicated to him since May 2017, nor did he make any reference to evidence furnished to him by a whistle-blower whose disclosures are included in the documents that I have now studied. 3.7. Same resulted in the comprehensive Chief Audit Executive review queries in that Mr Morrison had simply not performed, but more concerning is the fact that he collusively acted with Mr Mettler in concealment of impropriety by Mr Mettler, Dr Olver and others. 3.8. From the evidence before me, Mr Morrison is in all probability a compromised individual who did not render the service that he was appointed and paid for. This is how entrenched corruption is in our society, that even external forensic consultants are prepared to engage in the very same cancerous agenda that society is attempting to eradicate. 3.9. According to Mr Wiehart, Mr Trollip had even gone so far as to hide documents at his residence for a period of twenty-six months after a forensic report was furnished to a Hawks investigator in March 2018. Mr Trollip may say that he was the one who mandated the investigation, yet he must be made to account for his collusive actions in protection of corrupt officials and politicians. 3.10. This entire narrative raises a concern, which is that “the system” used in NMB to loot funds through companies like Mohlaleng Media could be, and probably is, “the system” that is replicated in other municipalities (and even other spheres of government) in favour of the corrupt and looting ruling party. 4. The leaked CR17 campaign bank statements: the same names crop up 4.1. Mr Wiehart further took me into confidence and shared information with me that relates to Linkd Environmental Services of which Dr Olver is, at the moment, the sole director. This three-man operation in 2017 entered into an SLA with Ria Tenda Trust (which belongs to President Ramaphosa) to provide accounting and financial services (https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/download/file/fid/1649) This is rather odd, because Linkd Environmental Services is not a financial services or accounting firm at all. What had apparently piqued Mr Wiehart interest had been that, given what had transpired in NMB, that this might be a case of history repeating itself. 4.2. I was shown some of the various leaked bank statements, that are quite easily accessible on social media platforms and, even though they have been sealed by the court , they therefore can never enjoy protection from public scrutiny. 4.3. What can be seen from these bank statements is that a bank account was utilised to channel alleged CR17 campaign funding. I find it questionable that the principals segregated so-called day to day business operations, with alleged campaign donations, as one would expect that separate trust accounts be opened and be managed in a transparent manner. 4.4. What was however of much interest to me, given the context of this submission, was that these statements showed the involvement of the very same individuals involved in the NMB/Mohlaleng Media corruption. They are Maverick State (formerly known as Mohlaleng Media), Crispian Olver, Cheslyn Mostert, Grant Pascoe, Vukile Pokwana and some others. 4.5. I was also shocked by some of the names of the listed beneficiaries, where I saw that many members of the ANC received money, totalling millions of Rands, in their personal bank accounts. Although, I hold no brief for the ANC as an organisation, I am concerned about Crispian Olver and Cheslyn Mostert’s seeming endgame. Whilst on the one hand, their hands may loom large in the corruption that has been taking place in NMB and on the other hand, Dr Olver’s company is alleged to have distributed millions of Rands to ANC members. There seems to be a strange disconnect between those actions. 4.6. That said, my concern is that, from where exactly did the funding in Dr Olver’s company bank account originate. On review of the deposits, it is evident that these origins are not vested in well-known and/or credible corporate resources from the private sector. Considering how Mohlaleng Media was used to fund and sustain the ruling party’s ever-hungry hyenas in NMB, one cannot believe that there is any legitimacy behind the so-called donor funding from private individuals or corporations. 4.7. Who are the real ‘donors’ and from where does such funding truly originate? Looking closely at the methodology used by Bosasa, and what could possibly be used by Linkd Environmental Services, one is left with unanswered questions as to who the real architects of state capture are. This is the actual question that must be considered, and investigated, by the Commission. 4.8. The innocuous words ‘donor funds’ are constantly used, whilst the biggest and most important ‘donor’ is the state through the looting of public funds. These so-called donor funds emanate directly from state contracts and government tenders and not from happy and morally complacent ANC supporters. 5. Conclusion 5.1. To verify the authenticity of the information contained in this submission, the Commission should consider conducting a preliminary investigation by engaging Mr Werner Wiehart. All the documentation I have scrutinised is available on request. 5.2. Furthermore, to aid its work, the Commission would be well advised to request the Public Protector’s report on its 2014/15 investigation of the NMB municipality’s IPTS system, as well as all the NMB corruption cases that have been reported to the police, Hawks, SIU and the NPA. 6. Parting shot: the money must be recovered from the ANC 6.1. We, at the moment, spend a lot of time talking about corruption and plumbing its depths, which is of course right. But we must also emphasise the imperative that all the moneys that have been pilfered through tender rigging, as was done with the eye-opening Bosasa shenanigans, in favour of ANC linked companies, or ANC leaders and linked individuals or the party itself, must be recuperated. 6.2. Tracing exactly into whose pocket the money went might look like an insurmountable task, and it probably will be a massive operation. But not tackling this task, would be short-changing South Africans from the moneys that should have been spent to make manifest their constitutional rights. Simple as that. 8. I remain at your disposal. Yours sincerely Mr Bantu Holomisa, MP President of the United Democratic Movement Copied to: • President of the Republic, Mr Cyril Ramaphosa • Minister of Finance, Mr Tito Mboweni • Speaker of the National Assembly, Ms Thandi Modise, for the relevant portfolio committees’ attention • NMB acting Executive Mayor, Cllr Thsonono Buyeye • NMB acting City Manager, Mr Mandla George

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