

June 23, 2022

**Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation
South African Police Service
Promat Building
1 Cresswell Road
Silverton
Pretoria
0186**

By Hand

Attention: Brigadier Basi

**RE: MEETING BETWEEN MR. ARTHUR FRASER AND MEMBERS OF THE
DPCI IN RELATION TO BELA-BELA CAS 93/06/2022**

**COMPLAINT AGAINST PRESIDENT MATAMELA CYRIL RAMAPHOSA,
MAJOR GENERAL WALTER RHOODE AND OTHERS**

1. The above investigation docket and the meeting between me, my legal representatives and Brigadier Basi and Colonel Schnelle of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation ('DPCI' and/or 'Hawks') of 15 June 2022, refers.
2. Thank you once again for the meeting and the promptness and professionalism displayed in attending to my complaint into the conduct of the President of the Republic of South Africa, President Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa, (***President Ramaphosa*** and/or ***the President***), the Head of the South African Police Services ('SAPS') Presidential Protection Unit, Major General Walter Rhooode (***Major General Rhooode***) and other persons.

3. As expressed during our meeting, I appreciate some of the difficulties and challenges the DPCI has, and which it may encounter, in investigating this matter.
4. Notwithstanding, it is for this reason that we undertook to write the DPCI to advise on some of the issues I conveyed, as obtained by me from various sources, during the course of our meeting and to advise on additional information that has subsequently come to my attention and which may assist in the course of the DPCI's investigation into the matter. I set out hereunder, not conclusions, but pointers of areas for further investigation. I do this not to accuse the individuals identified herein, but to assist your investigation as you requested me. I trust that these pointers can lead you to the truth and finality in your investigation.
5. As such I supplement my complaint and advise as follows:
 - 5.1. In response to a question from the DPCI investigators on where the money comes from, I advised that one of President Ramaphosa's closest Advisors, Mr. Bejani Chauke ('Mr. Chauke'), was ostensibly instrumental in illegally bringing large sums of US \$ into South Africa for both he and the President after returning from trips he undertook on behalf of President Ramaphosa to various countries, *inter alia*, including, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Morocco and Equatorial Guinea. The money was not declared to either the South African Revenue Services ('SARS') or the South African Reserve Bank ('SARB') and did not enter the formal banking system in this country. Mr. Chauke allegedly, also on occasion, utilized the services of privately chartered flights for his travels. In this regard, the movement control records of Mr. Chauke's international travels, along with his mode of transport and the associated costs thereof ought to be established.
 - 5.2. Mr. Chauke is said to have concealed the undisclosed amount of US \$ in one of his couches at his personal residence in Hydepark, Johannesburg and with the assistance of Major General Rhooode, transferred the couch to the President's residence at Phala Phala, with the full knowledge and acquiescence of the President. An analysis of the mobile telephone and tower networks of both Mr. Chauke and Major Rhooode's mobile telephones and vehicle tracking devices would shed some light hereon. Major General Rhooode's telephone numbers are 0833297959 & 0733012505, whilst Mr. Chauke's telephone numbers are 0833326666 and +2348165398559 (WhatsApp number).

- 5.3. This is the money that was stolen from the President's Phala Phala farm on 9 February 2020 and not any money derived from the sale of animals and/or the hunting of game as glibly articulated by the President on 5 June 2022 in his address to the closing of the African National Congress ('ANC') Limpopo Conference when he, *inter alia*, stated:

'... I want to reaffirm that I was not involved in any criminal conduct and once again I pledge my full cooperation with any form of investigation. Now due to the investigation I will not really be able to engage deeply or further on this matter as we should allow the due process to take place. However, I would like to say that I'm a farmer. I'm in the cattle business and the game business. And through that business that has been declared in parliament and all over. I buy and I sell animals. Sometimes people buy these animals and some of the people who buy these animals, some of them are here. I do it through the sales which are sometimes through cash and sometimes through transfers. Some of the people are offshore customers and who are sometimes local, come through and buy animals. And some of them come also to hunt on the farm. And, so this that is being reported was a clear business transaction of selling animals.'

- 5.4. Business records of the President's sale of animals (including auctions and private sales) and hunting that took place at Phala Phala and on other farms through which the President conducts business must be obtained for the period 1 March 2019 to 29 February 2020, detailing all transactions and all invoices, receipts and communications (including e-mail) in relation to sales and purchases.
- 5.5. Both the business banking records and personal banking records of the President for the period 1 March 2019 to 29 February 2020 must be obtained, detailing all credits and debits.
- 5.6. It would be prudent to obtain witness statements from the Phala Phala farm manager and/or sales manager and/or any other person(s) responsible for the day-to-day business activities relating to the sales (and auctions) of animals and the hunting of animals at Phala Phala and or any of the President's associated entities on which such business activities are said to have taken place during the period 1 March 2019 to 29 February 2020.
- 5.7. In particular, all cash business transactions must be identified, which must be confirmed with the purchaser(s), including person(s) having hunted on the property.
- 5.8. It must also be established what the business practice is in relation to the handling of cash business transactions and where the monies are ordinarily kept.

- 5.9. The company registration documents in relation to Phala Phala and any of the President's associated entities on which business activities such as the sale (and auctions) of animals and the hunting of animals are said to have taken place during the period 1 March 2019 to 29 February 2020, must be obtained.
- 5.10. It must further be established from the SARB whether the President and/or Phala Phala, and/or any of the President's farming, animal or hunting entities had declared the possession of any foreign currency or any business transactions in foreign currency and/or had obtained any authorization from the Reserve Bank in this regard. Particularly, US \$'s.
- 5.11. It must be established from SARS whether the President and/or Phala Phala, and/or any of the President's farming, animal or hunting entities had declared any income through foreign currency, particularly US \$ in the submission of business and personal tax returns for the period concerned.
- 5.12. The Financial Intelligence Centre ('FIC') is in possession of a report demonstrating that the President does not utilize his private bank account for day-to-day transactions as is ordinarily expected of any person. A copy hereof ought to be obtained.
- 5.13. Mr. Chauke is said to have purchased a Mercedes Benz V Class, G Class and V Class registered in the name of his younger sister.
- 5.14. Mr. Chauke also purchased a house in Hyde Park for R10 Million during 2019, which is presently being renovated by a certain Themba Rikhotso.
- 5.15. Approximately 3 weeks ago, after charges were laid against the President, Mr. Chauke is said to have moved US\$ 20 million in cash to a South African citizen, Mr. Zahir Vallie with ID Number 7402115223084 for safekeeping for himself and the President. Mr Zahir Vallie's mobile telephone number is 0825305989.
- 5.16. Mr Zahir Vallie trades in property in Cape Town, called Z Prop. Mr Zahir Vallie's property portfolio is estimated to be worth approximately R800 million. He is known to bring large amounts of foreign currency into South Africa from the Middle East without declarations, through Cape Town International airport. Information received indicates that all his properties bought are cash purchases. It is well known that his properties are running at a considerable financial loss with low returns, clearly a sign of significant money laundering.

- 5.17. Mr. Chauke clearly enjoys a lavish lifestyle far beyond that to be expected of a Presidential Advisor. It is prudent that a lifestyle audit be conducted into the affairs of Mr. Chauke.
- 5.18. Mr. Chauke was further also instrumental in assisting the President and Major General Rhooode with the investigations into the theft at Phala Phala. In this regard, the following persons rendered, *inter alia*, assistance in the investigation to the President, Mr. Chauke and Major General Rhooode into the theft at Phala Phala:
- 5.18.1. Constable Rikhotso, a member of the Presidential Protection Services.
 - 5.18.2. Constable Jabu Mahlangu, a member of the Presidential Protection Services.
 - 5.18.3. Colonel Smanga Simelane ('Colonel Simelane') of the South African Police Services ('SAPS') Crime Intelligence.
 - 5.18.4. Dr Anton Deon De Swardt ('Dr De Swardt'), a farmer and a managing partner at De Swardt Myambo Hlahla Attorneys, 941 Jan Shoba Street (Cnr Mackenzie Street), Brooklyn, Pretoria.
 - 5.18.5. Deputy Minister of Human Settlements, Water and Sanitation, Mr. David Mahlobo ('Deputy Minister Mahlobo')
 - 5.18.6. Deputy Minister in the Presidency, Mr. Zizi Kodwa ('Deputy Minister Kodwa')
 - 5.18.7. Mr. Sean McCarthy of the Sean McCarthy Group ('SMG'), ('Mr. McCarthy').
 - 5.18.8. Mr. Karl Lars Magnusson ('Mr Magnusson'), 19 St Louis Avenue, Fresnaye, Cape Town
 - 5.18.9. Paul O'Sullivan ('Mr O'Sullivan')
- 5.19. Constable Rikhotso, whose mobile telephone number is 0780150003, is said to have assisted in the tracing of the persons alleged to have broken into the President's residence using government resources and in torturing them in Cape Town. Constable Jabu Mahlangu's mobile telephone number is 0716781482.
- 5.20. Colonel Simelane, whose contact number is 0824474958, is said to have assisted Mr. Chauke, with whom he enjoys a particularly close

relationship, in the tracing of the alleged to have broken into the President's residence using government resources.

- 5.21. Dr De Swardt is one of the President's farming neighbors near Phala Phala and is the farmer with investigation capacity who assisted in the viewing of the video security footage from the respective security cameras at Phala Phala and who assisted the President in the tracing of the persons alleged to have broken into the President's residence.
- 5.22. Deputy Minister Mahlobo, a former Minister of State Security, used his network of contacts to assist in the tracing of the persons alleged to have broken into the President's residence.
- 5.23. Deputy Minister Kodwa accompanied Major General Rhooode on numerous trips to Namibia in engaging with the Namibian President and Namibian law enforcement authorities on the matter.
- 5.24. Mr O'Sullivan, who is a close associate of both the President and Mr. Chauke, is said to have used his private investigation company to assist in the tracing of the persons alleged to have broken into the President's residence.
- 5.25. Mr McCarthy is said to have assisted the President and Mr. Chauke in facilitating converting large sums of US\$ into Rands. Mr McCarthy is also said to have most of his capital kept offshore in Mauritius. Mr McCarthy's mobile telephone number is 0832508209 and his email address is sean@smg.co.za.
- 5.26. Mr Magnusson, a neighbour to President Ramaphosa in Cape Town, and who is presently believed to be illegally in South Africa, is said to have not only assisted in facilitating converting large sums of US\$ into Rands, but also assisted in the pinging of persons alleged to have broken into the President's residence and actively participated in their subsequent torture.
- 5.27. Government grabber devices were also used to trace and ping persons alleged to have broken into the President's residence. In this regard, one of the numbers pinged was that of Erkki Shikongo, namely, 0739780397.
- 5.28. The telephone number of one of the members of Major General Rhooode's team who assisted in the investigation, namely, Mr. Trevor Fredericks, who is since deceased, was 0798229774.

- 5.29. The President, through Mr. Chauke, had paid substantial amounts of money between February 2020 and July 2021 to trace persons alleged to have broken into the President's residence and to recoup some of the stolen US \$.
- 5.30. During our meeting of 15 June 2022, I furnished the DPCI investigators with a copy of the Crime Intelligence Report from the Namibian Service, authored by Commissioner Nelius Becker, dated 21 June 2020 and simultaneously provided a high level assessment of the Namibian Crime Intelligence report.
- 5.31. Importantly, the Namibian Crime Intelligence Report (notably p.5) corroborates what I had been told by another source, as well as corroborated and provided further information to the evidence submitted together with his affidavit filed at the Rosebank police station on 1 June 2022, notably:
- 5.31.1. When the Namibian Police interviewed Mr. Imanuwela David, he confirmed that they had stolen US \$ of President Ramaphosa that was concealed inside the furniture at President Ramaphosa's Phala Phala farm. This is how the Namibian authorities became aware of the theft that had taken place at Phala Phala farm.
 - 5.31.2. The report details that the domestic worker, employed at Phala Phala farm had assisted Mr. Imanuwela David and his co-conspirators in locating the US \$ concealed in the furniture at Phala Phala farm.
 - 5.31.3. The report further details that the domestic worker also identified the suspects when she was confronted by South African authorities about the theft and as a result was not apprehended.
 - 5.31.4. The report reflects that the Namibian authorities detected Mr. Imanuwela David when he illegally entered Namibia on or about 7 June 2020.

- 5.32. I further pointed out to the Hawks that there is a Colonel Edwards (female) who is attached to the South African Embassy in Namibia as the SAPS attaché and that she had been the nodal point of communication between the Namibian Police and the South African SAPS at the time in 2020, which communication was initiated by the Namibian authorities.
- 5.33. In this regard, the report reflects that the Namibian Police had provided Colonel Edwards with a copy of the RSA passport of Mr. Imanuwela David pursuant to detecting his illegal entry into Namibia and asked to establish if there was a warrant of arrest issued for Mr. Imanuwela David in South Africa.
- 5.34. Colonel Edwards in turn reverted to the Namibian Police that there was no warrant of arrest issued for Mr Imanuwela David in South Africa, but that he has prior convictions for drunken driving, assault GBH and drinking in public.
- 5.35. The Namibian authorities had asked SAPS to follow up on the cell number of **"Papa J"** and details of the vehicle that dropped Mr Imanuwela David at Rooiwal.
- 5.36. The SAPS subsequently reverted to the Namibian Police Service through Colonel Edwards that the vehicle was a Hyundai I20 with GP registration plates (no vehicle registration plate details provided). SAPS further reported that the vehicle had four occupants who claimed that they were from KZN. A cell number of one of the occupants named **"Prince"** was obtained, notably: +27780452908.
- 5.37. It would thus be prudent to interview Colonel Edwards and obtain her statement in relation to her interaction with the Namibian authorities assistance hereon and the relevant assistance rendered.
- 5.38. Page 2 of the Namibian Police Intelligence Report references the acting CEO of Fishcor, Mr. Paulus Ngalangi as having been arrested by the Namibian authorities in June 2020 for assisting Mr. Imanuwela David to illegally cross from South Africa into Namibia on 13 June 2020. Mr. Ngalangi is currently out on bail and the criminal case is still ongoing. Mr Ngalangi had to subsequently resign from his employment with Fishcor.

- 5.39. Mr. Fraser referred the DPCI investigators to recent articles in the Namibian media (as of June 2022) confirming the arrest of Mr. Paulus Ngalangi in 2020 for assisting Mr. Imanuwela David to illegally cross the South African / Namibian border into Namibia on 13 June 2020.
- 5.40. I subsequently learned that Mr Imanuwela David and Mr Paulus Ngalangi are related and further that both Mr. Imanuwela David and Mr Paulus Ngalangi are related to Mr. James Hatuikulipi who is one of the accused in the infamous 'Fishrot' corruption case pending in the Namibian High Court. The Namibian Home Affairs department and the Namibian police can confirm these relations.
- 5.41. Mr. James Hatuikulipi is also closely linked to the President of Namibia. Information available is that one of the suspects in the matter, Mr. Maren De Klerk, an attorney, implicates some of the accused, along with the President of Namibia.
- 5.42. It is believed that Mr. Imanuwela David was laundering money into Namibia to cover the legal costs of some of the accused in the pending 'Fishrot' case.
- 5.43. It is also evident that Major General Rhooode's request for a meeting with the Namibian Commissioner of Police came about after the exchange of information between the Namibian Police and SAPS (through the SA Embassy in Namibia regarding Mr Imanuwela David and what had been discovered regarding an alleged theft at the Phala Phala farm of President Ramaphosa.
- 5.44. At page 6, par 2 of the Namibian Police's Crime Intelligence Report, I highlighted that according to the report, Major General Rhooode contacted the Namibian Police Special Branch, Crime Intelligence to set up a meeting in "**No man's land**" at Ariamsvlei border post.
- 5.45. During the meeting at "**No man's land**", Major General Rhooode confirmed to his Namibian counterpart that "**something**" took place at President Ramaphosa's Phala Phala farm and that Mr. Imanuwela David was the mastermind behind the burglary.

- 5.46. Major General Rhooode, according to the report, supplied names and photographs of Mr Imanuwela David's accomplices and advised that due to the sensitivity of the matter and the envisaged fallout that it will create in South Africa, that the matter be handled with discretion.
- 5.47. The report further also noted that discussions were allegedly ongoing between the Presidents of South Africa and Namibia.
- 5.48. Page 7 of the report detailed that correspondence was subsequently written to the South African Police Service to follow up on the telephone numbers of "**Papa J**" and "**Prince**".
- 5.49. In addition, according to the report, the Namibian authorities would liaise with their South African counterparts regarding, on, inter alia:
- 5.49.1. The Namibian FIC to analyse the available bank accounts of the Namibian suspects and to liaise with the FIC in South Africa.
- 5.49.2. A letter to be sent to South Africa to establish if there is a predicate offence in South Africa, which would justify money laundering investigations in Namibia.
- 5.50. The Namibian authorities have subsequently publicly confirmed having written to South Africa in July 2020 seeking the requisite assistance in the investigation into the matter.
- 5.51. In this regard, the Namibian authorities can be engaged informally and/or formally to confirm the correctness of the contents of their report and to obtain witness statements, bank records and copies of the Namibian letter(s) to South Africa in which it seeks assistance, and a copy of the Namibian FIC report.
- 5.52. The report also stated that prior the housebreaking and theft at the President's farm, Mr. Imanuwela David and his fellow perpetrators spent a few days at Aventura, Warmbaths, Limpopo where the plan to break into the President's residence was devised. It would probably be advisable for the DPCI to approach Aventura and establish the correctness thereof. If in the affirmative, the names, addresses, contact details etc. of the person(s) who affected the bookings and the records of the stay ought to be obtained.

- 5.53. I was further advised that when the domestic worker was interrogated by Major General Rhooode and his informal investigative team, she had informed them that the persons who had broken into the home of the President had returned to Western Cape immediately after the break-in.
- 5.54. During about February to March 2020, Major General Rhooode's informal investigation team then contacted individuals within the SAPS Detective Services in Cape Town, advising under false pretense that they had information on individuals that were linked to drug smuggling.
- 5.55. In this fictitious "**drug smuggling**" claim, Major General Rhooode's informal investigation then provided the details of some of the individuals involved in the Phala Phala theft to the SAPS Detective services to track the individuals concerned.
- 5.56. As a result, an enquiry was opened into fictitious drug smuggling when in fact the investigation related to a crime committed at President Ramaphosa's Phala Phala farm.
- 5.57. Under this subterfuge, the detectives in Cape Town were able to trace the suspects to a residence in Milnerton, Cape Town, which was later, raided and where four males were temporarily detained. Photographs of the detainees, laying handcuffed on the floor are annexed hereto for ease of reference.
- 5.58. The detectives did not find any drugs on any of the suspects, but found cellphones and documents which they seized and booked into the Cape Town Central SAPS 13.
- 5.59. These devices were then handed over to DPCI Bellville to download the information from these devices, which subsequently assisted Major General Rhooode and his team in locating and tracking the alleged perpetrators of the theft at President Ramaphosa's Phala Phala farm.
- 5.60. Identity documents of the suspects were seized by Major General Rhooode's team and a link chart was developed. A copy thereof is annexed hereto for ease of reference.

- 5.61. A list of telephone numbers, extracted from the devices was also provided to Major General Rhoode and his team.
- 5.62. During our meeting I also indicated to the Hawks Investigators that he is aware that a sum of US\$ 500 000, of the money stolen at Phala Phala farm, was exchanged at a Chinese pawnshop in Hout Street, Houtbay, Cape Town.
- 5.63. I further advised of an individual who facilitated the exchange of US \$ at the Chinese pawnshop, who is being identified.
- 5.64. I have also been reliably informed that Mr. Chauke has photographs of US dollars wrapped in shrink-wrap on his WhatsApp number.
- 5.65. It would be advisable to obtain the relevant documents reflecting the purchase of moveable and immovable property by the alleged perpetrators of the theft at Phala Phala in both South Africa and Namibia.
- 5.66. The detailed bank records of the alleged perpetrators of the theft at Phala Phala ought to be obtained in both South Africa and Namibia.
- 5.67. The certified court record depicting the charges on which Mr Imanuwela David has since pleaded guilty on and in respect of which he had paid a fine ought to be obtained.
- 5.68. The FIC also needs to be approached in relation to any information it may have obtained and any analysis it may have conducted.
- 5.69. It ought to be established whether the leadership of the SAPS, including the Minister of Police, were aware of the theft of the monies at the President's Phala Phala farm.
- 5.70. The SAPS ought to advise whether it had received a formal or informal request from the Namibian authorities to render assistance in the Namibian investigation.

- 5.71. The SAPS ought also to advise on the resources and costs expended by it in the course and scope of the investigation.
- 5.72. It ought to be established whether the Director-General: Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, who is the central authority for letters of request for mutual legal assistance received any formal or informal request for assistance from the Namibian authorities.
- 5.73. It ought also to be established whether the Minister: Justice and Constitutional Development was aware of any informal or formal assistance requested by the Namibian authorities. I have been reliably informed that the Namibian Ministry of Justice is in possession of a receipt from the courier company confirming delivery of the Namibian letter seeking assistance from the South African authorities in relation to its own investigation into the matter.
- 5.74. The DPCI investigators ought also to establish from the National Director of Public Prosecutions ('NDPP') whether any informal or formal assistance was sought by the Namibian authorities and if in the affirmative why no assistance was rendered.
- 5.75. The National Prosecuting Authority ('NPA') must also advise whether any processes in terms of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act No. 121 of 1998 were invoked in relation to any of the alleged perpetrators apprehended under the subterfuge of a fictitious drug investigation and/or any investigation related to the alleged perpetrators of the theft at Phala Phala or any of the alleged perpetrators close associates.
- 5.76. Telephones were seized from Mr. Imanuwela David in Namibia and from alleged perpetrators in South Africa, in respect of which data was extracted. The data ought to be obtained in respect of all the telephones and SIM cards seized both in Namibia and South Africa. The detailed itemized billing in respect of all the telephone numbers ought to also be obtained from the relevant service providers.
- 5.77. A copy of both the media statement issued by the Presidency on 2 June 2022 and the address by President Ramaphosa at the closing of the ANC Limpopo Conference ought to be obtained along with any statements the President made in Parliament in relation to the theft at Phala Phala.

- 5.78. Copies of the media statement issued by the Presidency in Namibia and the Commissioner of Police in relation to the matter ought also to be obtained.
- 5.79. The alleged perpetrators also invested in businesses in both Namibia and South Africa. The records, including financial records in this regard ought to be obtained.
6. I remain available and committed to render assistance to the DPCI in furtherance of its investigation into the matter.
7. Should you require any further information or assistance from me, do not hesitate to contact my legal representatives.

Yours faithfully



Arthur Joseph Peter Fraser